Brief Explanatory Notes on the Distorted Facts of Luncanamarca in the People's War of Peru*

The Second Right Opportunist Line of the Communist Party of Peru

September 2006

Contents

	Note	e from the Translator	4
1		of Notes on the Distorted Facts of Lu- namarca	5
No	tes o	on the Distorted Facts of Lucanamarca	5
	1.1	The Beginning and Development of the People's War in Ayacucho	7
	1.2	Peruvian State Guided by Genocidal Policy	39
	1.3	Armed Clashes of Lucanamarca Stifled Mesnadas	59
	1.4	Homage to the Heroes of the People	87
Νo	tes	1	.00

Note from the Translator

This is a document authored by what is known as the Second Right Opportunist Line of the Communist Party of Peru, headed by "Comrade Miriam" and now MOVADEF. This line pretends that Gonzalo formed a peace agreement with the old Peruvian state, despite the overwhelming evidence against it and total lack of concrete evidence in favor of it. They have promoted and even written forged statements that they claim to be written by Gonzalo, when that is not the case. This line is not a Communist line, and it would prove fatal to pretend that it is.

It is fair to ask, why would I promote a work written by such people? Written by rats, traitors, liars, and enemies of the Peruvian proletariat? I promote this work because I believe that its content is primarily good, although it has many issues of revisionism in it, (primarily, but not exclusively, spreading the false notion that Gonzalo had authored the "peace letters" and pushed for "peace negotiations.") this work serves as a good source of information regarding the Lucanamarca massacre, an event frequently brought up by the open enemies of the Communist Party of Peru.

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1 Brief Explanatory Notes on the Distorted Facts of Lucanamarca in the People's War of Peru

(Document to be delivered to the National Criminal Chamber as part of the Judicial Defense in the "Megaproceso")

"A great revolution cannot avoid going through a civil war. This is a law. If you see only the negative side of the war and not its positive side, you have only a partial view of the war."

Chairman Mao Zedong.

"Our revolution belongs to the poorest of the poor, to those who do not have a world, to those who have to make that world, because it has expelled them, marginalized them, annihilates them every day. We represent the proletariat and unite with the poor peasantry, the fate of the revolution depends on their uprising."

"Our problem is to unite the poor, the poor never against the poor, the people never against the people."

II Plenary Session of the Expanded Central Committee. January 1983. Chairman Gonzalo.

"...we must seek that the truth breaks through and that the facts are historically recorded as they have been; As no one escapes, the episodes lived are already an indelible part of our history, let us serve, therefore, that future generations reach clear and imperishable."

Develop the People's War by Serving the World Revolution. August 1986. Chairman Gonzalo.

The People's War led by the Communist Party of Peru, under the leadership of Chairman Gonzalo, and initiated on May 17, 1980, is the largest revolutionary social movement in Peruvian history, covered almost the entire country, constituting the largest mobilization and armed action of the popular masses, mainly poor peasants, recorded in our history. However, it has been and is denied in its true character, successive black campaigns are mounted to discredit it and feed public opinion against accusing it of "terrorism," following the dictates of Yankee imperialism; the events that occurred in her trial are deliberately distorted, with the purpose of discrediting her, isolating her, covering up with a cloak of impunity the genocidal policy of the Peruvian State

in its counter-revolutionary war, as well as the Armed Forces, Police and complementary. But they also use these twists and falsifications in judicial processes to justify draconian sentences such as life imprisonment, having their spearhead against Chairman Gonzalo, comrade Miriam and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Peru.

The armed confrontations in Lucanamarca and surrounding areas, on April 3, 1983, are one of the facts that have been crudely and repeatedly distorted to fabricate a supposed "paradigm" of "massacre of an unarmed population," starting by presenting it as a fact outside the war process or dissociating it from the plan of the Armed Forces to use masses against masses. Following the old imperialist norm of pitting natives against natives, forming mesnadas (armed retinues) to destroy the newly emerged Power and re-establish its old power. This document seeks to serve to record the facts as they really have been.

1.1 The Beginning and Development of the People's War in Ayacucho

1. The decades of the 1960s and 1970s in the 20th century represented the arduous and tumultuous struggle of Chairman Gonzalo and the Red Fraction, founded, forged, and guided by him, to concretize and finalize the reconstitution of the Communist Party of Peru as a new type of party, Marxist-Leninist-Maoist, Gonzalo thought and which prepared for the beginning of armed

struggle. The faction whose development began in the Regional Committee of Ayacucho, and as Lenin taught: "In the Party, the faction is a group of men united by the community of ideas, created with the primary objective of influencing the Party in a certain direction, with the aim of applying its own principles in the Party in the purest possible form. For this, a genuine community of ideas is necessary." ¹

Chairman Gonzalo and comrade Miriam stated: "Since the beginning of the 1960s, we have been working to prepare for the start of armed struggle in a society like semifeudal, semi-colonial, and bureaucratic capitalist Peru, with a state system of pseudo-bourgeois democracy and obsolete parasitic political parties: a society whose oppression and exploitation, for centuries, has plunged the people into hunger, poverty, ignorance, and backwardness, which constrains their productive forces, preventing the development and democracy that the masses demand and need. Our action unfolded by distancing ourselves from the so-called left and especially by combating revisionism, whose parties are nothing more than minor partners of the others and support for the old system." ²

Over the course of those decades, and as recorded in extensive and widely disseminated public documentation, the Communist Party of Peru, based on its ideology, Marxist-Leninist-Maoism, Gonzalo thought, solidly established the need to transform Peruvian society in a state of general crisis through a Democratic Revolution. They achieved this by developing the People's War, which is the highest military theory of the prole-

tariat established by Chairman Mao Zedong, and creatively applied and developed to the specific conditions of the Peruvian revolution by Chairman Gonzalo. The People's War, by "...following the path of surrounding the cities from the countryside, creates revolutionary support bases, progressively destroying the old reactionary landowner-bureaucratic state in order to create a New Democratic Republic." ³

For the Communist Party of Peru, the analysis of the country's situation must start from three fundamental problems, which are in summary:

"

- 1. The Peruvian state is landlord-bureaucratic, a dictatorship of feudal landlords and big bourgeoisie under the control of North American imperialism: against this, the people struggle for the construction of a New Democratic State that requires the destruction of the existing old order.
- 2. The Peruvian state, like any state, sustains, defends, and develops using violence: against this, the people need revolutionary violence following the path of surrounding the cities from the countryside.
- 3. Elections are a means of domination by landlords and big bourgeoisie: they are not an instrument of transformation for

the people or a means to overthrow the power of the dominants, hence the just orientation to use them only for the purposes of agitation and propaganda."⁴

It is analyzed and shown that the Peruvian people were experiencing a deep crisis, sinking into increasing impoverishment, hunger, misery, lack of rights, and abuse, making the situation unsustainable. All of this made evident the existence of a developing revolutionary situation, expressed in the fact that those at the bottom could no longer live as they had been doing for centuries and that those at the top could no longer continue to govern as they had been doing. These conditions generated a growing popular protest expressed in mobilizations and struggles such as the tireless peasant movement, the rising workers' and popular movement, producing a political crisis in the very foundations of the State. There was only one revolutionary solution. At this juncture, many advocated for the need for revolution, but only Chairman Gonzalo and the Communist Party of Peru took the decision to make it happen, and they did.

Let us point out that "...Chairman Gonzalo establishes that the Peruvian revolution in its historical course must be first democratic, then socialist revolution, and it will have to develop cultural revolutions in order to move towards communism, all in an uninterrupted process applying the People's War and specifying it." The semifeudal, semi-colonial character of Peruvian society is defined, on which a bureaucratic capitalism develops. The

1.1 The Beginning and Development of the People's War in Ayacucho

"targets of the democratic revolution" are fixed: imperialism, bureaucratic capitalism, and semi-feudality, one of them being the main target depending on the moment the revolution goes through; today, in the period of agrarian war, the main target is semi-feudality. The tasks to be carried out in this stage are specified:

- 1. Destroy imperialist domination, mainly Yankee;
- 2. Destroy bureaucratic capitalism, confiscating the great monopolistic state and non-state capital;
- 3. Destroy feudal landownership, confiscating the large associative and non-associative property, individually delivering land under the slogan "Land for those who work it" to poor peasants first and foremost;
- 4. Support the middle class by allowing them to work under certain conditions. Likewise, the social classes to be united are defined: the proletariat, mainly poor peasants, the petty bourgeoisie, and the middle bourgeoisie, considering the proletariat as the leading class and the peasant as the main force; establishing a joint dictatorship of workers, peasants, and petty bourgeoisie under the hegemony of the proletariat, respecting the interests of the middle bourgeoisie. In the New State, the "agrarian tactic of fighting the evolution of semi-feudality, aiming at associative property and thwarting non-associative property, neutralizing the rich peasantry, winning over the middle peasantry, and re-

lying on the poor peasantry" is applied. Likewise, "Reaffirming in Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, Chairman Gonzalo raises the principle that agrarian reform is the destruction of feudal landownership, individual delivery of land to peasants under the slogan 'land for those who work it,' and that it is achieved through People's War and New Power, directed by the Communist Party; also, Lenin's thesis that there are two paths in agriculture: the landlord who is reactionary, evolves feudalism, and leads to the old state, and the peasant who is advanced, destroys feudalism, and leads to the New State" is applied.⁸ And applying Marx's thesis on the types of revolutionary and conservative peasantry, it is stated: "The revolutionary peasantry is for the destruction of feudalism and individual land distribution. The reactionary peasant is for the maintenance of feudal property and the existing order, at most for evolution, not destruction. The revolutionary peasant represents the future, the reactionary peasant represents the past."9

Finally: "This task is not easy, but Marx taught us: 'Making history would be quite easy if the struggle were undertaken only with the absolutely certain probabilities of victory.' Let us keep in mind these words of the founder of Marxism, and starting from the existence of a revolutionary situation in development, let us focus on developing the subjective conditions for our revolution, on the instruments to carry it forward, the Party, united front, and armed struggle, primarily in the first,

since it is 'the heroic combatant' that manages the other two, with the criterion that the united front is for armed struggle, and that this is the crucible in which both the united front and the Party itself are forged and developed. Therefore, the key to the issue is to develop the political activity of the masses, mainly the poor peasantry, in order to initiate armed struggle. There is no other way or perspective. Chairman Mao Zedong wrote: 'In China, the main form of struggle is war, and the main form of organization is the Army. All other forms, such as the organizations and struggles of the popular masses, are also very important and absolutely indispensable, and in no way should they be left aside, but the objective of all of them is to serve the war. Before the outbreak of a war, all organizations and struggles aim to prepare for it...' These wise words, without forgetting our specific conditions, are fully valid for us: the problem in Peru is to initiate armed struggle. It will be to begin the superior form of struggle and the definitive struggle to fulfill the national-democratic revolution. The initiation of armed struggle is the north of the political action of communists and revolutionaries today. Our immediate task, today, is to develop the growing popular protest in order to initiate armed struggle. Let us develop the growing popular protest!" ¹⁰ And have the understanding and conviction that "thus, we must understand that the revolutionary struggle will be hard, violent, cruelly contested by the reaction and will send its black hosts armed to the teeth to attack us, to attack the working class, the peasantry, the popular masses. They will extend their sinister, bloody claws. It will lay siege to us, seek to isolate us, crush us, wipe us out, but we are the future, we are the force, we are the history." ¹¹

2. Regarding the work of the Party in Ayacucho in the 1960s and 1970s, we can say that "in the mid-1950s, the struggle to reactivate the Party began, which had been dissolved after Odría's coup. Later, the struggle against revisionism began to emerge within the Party: this process occurred in the midst of the impact of the Cuban revolution and mainly because the struggle between Marxism and revisionism began to unfold worldwide. The path of the revolution began to be discussed, and armed struggle was once again talked about." 12 This is when the political positions of Chairman Gonzalo began to stand out, laying the foundations for the red line and adhering to Chairman Mao's positions in the struggle between Marxism and revisionism. At the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, a large peasant movement developed, mobilizing 300 to 500 thousand peasants in the central and southern parts of the country, fighting for land. In the following years, there was a growing movement of labor strikes and a university struggle developed at a higher level. All of this had an impact on the Party. Chairman Gonzalo forged the Red Fraction of the Party in Ayacucho, with clear ideas that the Communist Party of Peru was to take power, assuming Marxism, adhering to Chairman Mao and the Communist Party of China, paying special attention to peasant work, and conceiving that the path was from the countryside to the city. Thus, Ayacucho is the birthplace of the Red Fraction.

Since 1962, Chairman Gonzalo has been dedicated to rebuilding the Party in the Ayacucho Regional Committee as a proletarian, clandestine, and mass-oriented party, with a focus on rural workers rather than university or teaching professionals as is wrongly and selfishly claimed. From 1960 to 1969, Chairman Gonzalo led the Red Fraction under the strategic policy of following the "Path of surrounding the cities from the countryside." Through a difficult process of struggle between two lines, revisionism was eliminated, and support was given to the struggles of the poor peasant population, which materialized as the invasion of Pomacocha and Ccaccamarca during those years. From these experiences, the lesson was learned that it is not enough to seize land if there is no armed revolutionary movement that continues towards the goal of completing the Democratic Revolution, as there is a risk that they will be reintegrated into the prevailing system, and a clique of new landowners will prevail. The 1st Congress of the Provincial Federation of Campesinos de Huamanga was held, and the poor masses of the city of Ayacucho were organized in the Federation of Neighborhoods. The Revolutionary Student Front (FER) was organized, and the Women's Fraction of the FER was formed. However, the crucial point is that despite the opposition of the New Central Leadership of the PCP, Chairman Gonzalo organized the "special work," which is the military work of the Regional Committee, and gave it three functions: political, military, and logistical, developing the struggle against militarism, mercenaryism, and focism. In 1965, Chairman Gonzalo opposed the dissolution of the Party and its subordination to the MIR and ELN in a supposed front.

Peasant work developed in the provinces of Huamanga, Huanta, La Mar, Cangallo, Víctor Fajardo, the northern part of Apurímac, and the east of Huancavelica. In May of 1969, Chairman Gonzalo established the Agrarian Program of the Party, and the First Regional Convention of Ayacucho Peasants was held, where representatives of the poor peasantry gathered for the first time. Various mass organizations decided to take an important step by forming the People's Defense Front of Ayacucho. Later, the Female Fraction of the FER became the People's Women's Movement, and the Revolutionary Front of Secondary Students (FRES) was structured.

In June of 1969, on the 20th, 21st, and 22nd days, student and parent mobilizations took place in the cities of Ayacucho and Huanta against decree 006 issued by Velasco's fascist regime. The struggle in defense of Popular Education was resolutely supported by the People's Defense Front, spreading to other provinces. Faced with the repression that caused dozens of deaths among secondary students, university students, and peasants, the popular struggle expanded, and Velasco's fascist regime was forced to repeal the aforementioned decree, suffering its first political defeat.

From 1969 to 1976, Chairman Gonzalo led the Red

Fraction in the application of the strategic policy of "Reconstitution of the Party for People's War." Amidst the struggle against Velasco's fascist regime and against the rightist liquidationism that emerged within the Party, which aimed to destroy it by legalizing it, an internal rupture occurred in February 1970, and at the II Plenum of the Central Committee, the Red Fraction assumed leadership of the Party. The fundamental problem of that struggle was the peasant problem, essentially assuming the confiscation of land as proposed by the Red Fraction and not the expropriation proposed by the rightist liquidationism.

In 1972, the Red Fraction established the Strategic Plan of the Ayacucho Regional Committee, which was of great significance in promoting peasant work throughout the Ayacucho, Apurímac, and Huancavelica regions and strengthening it through the displacement of militants. From 1974-75, peasant mobilization intensified, important peasant conventions were held, such as the Regional Convention of Peasant Women, the organization of Movements of Poor Peasants multiplied, and persistent politicization work was carried out through People's Schools both in the countryside and in the city, with priority given to peasant work in the Andahuaylas-Cangallo Zonal Committee. In those intense years, the Party developed unprecedented work with intellectuals to guide them towards becoming revolutionaries and communists, materializing in the Mariátegui Intellectual Work Center (CTIM), disseminating Allpa publications for the peasant movement, and publishing the Rimariyña Warmi magazine of the People's Women's Movement. The Party established the specific class line of the SUTEP and led the fight in defense of the Peruvian University, promoting the National Congress of Teachers of the Peruvian University (FENDUP), and the prior realization, amidst struggle, of the Union of Teachers of the San Cristóbal de Huamanga University.

The struggle of the Red Fraction led by Chairman Gonzalo allowed the work in Ayacucho to serve the Reconstitution of the Party in other parts of the country, to crush the left liquidationism that aimed to destroy the Party by confining it within four walls and denying the importance of peasant and mass work in general. Thus, with the establishment of the Party Construction Plan in April 1977 and the Armed Struggle Scheme in 1978, the Ayacucho Regional Committee entered into the general reorganization of the Party, focusing on work in the countryside, developing armed struggle as the main form of struggle, and revolutionary armed forces as the main form of organization, laying the foundation for the construction of the three instruments of the revolution.

At this point, and to conclude, we are interested in discussing some characteristics of the Ayacucho, Apurímac, and Huancavelica region, particularly regarding the weight of semi-feudalism in it, especially when some government agencies and individuals have explicitly denied it.

The three departments in the Central-Southern region of the country form one of the poorest, most backward, and forgotten regions throughout the republican history, with a mainly peasant population of almost one and a half million inhabitants, 80% of whom are in poverty and 65% in extreme poverty, with an outdated and crisis-ridden agriculture, subjected to the control of gamonales and gamonalillos in the midst of the densest servile relationships, and a local power that is overbearing and despotic. The region has the highest rates of infant mortality, malnutrition, tuberculosis, and illiteracy. All of this evidence indicates semi-feudalism in decay and a latent and increasingly significant peasant movement. The region, besides constituting an economic unit, has a rich tradition of struggle and is a rugged mountainous terrain above 3,000 meters above sea level.

What is being proposed serves the region exactly: "The outdated semi-feudal system continues to exist and mark the country from its deepest roots to its most elaborate ideas, and essentially maintaining the persistent problem of land, which is the driving force of the peasant class struggle, especially the poor who are the vast majority." Semi-feudalism, the basic problem of society, is expressed in land, servitude, and landlordism, which means that the vast majority of peasants are poor peasants without land or with very little, which gives rise to subsistence farming subject to the voracity of large estates, a "system of servitude which, as Lenin said, appears in a thousand different forms but its essence is personal subjugation," and landlordism, which "does not only designate a social and economic category, but an entire phenomenon represented not only by the landlords themselves but also includes a long hierarchy of officials, intermediaries, agents, parasites, etc., and the central factor of the phenomenon is the hegemony of the large semi-feudal property in politics and in the mechanism of the state, which must be attacked at its root." "Landlordism, a political manifestation of semi-feudalism on which this regime of servitude is based, in which bosses and lackeys act as representatives of the old state in the most remote villages of the country, although they change their guise according to the government of the moment; the spearhead of the agrarian war in the democratic revolution is directed against this factor." ¹³

Until the 1970s, haciendas still existed in the region where the system of personal provision (various forms of forced labor) was maintained. Payment for land rent was still made in labor, products, and mainly in money. The vast majority of peasants lacked land or had very little. The application of agrarian laws that are nothing but buying and selling land increased the fragmentation of smallholdings, and with the introduction of mortgages and the action of usurers, a new process of concentration within the evolutive forms of semi-feudalism was promoted. Land dispossession and usurpation had the support and backing of local power. In communities, wealthy peasants became gamonalillos, dispossessing land and imposing feudal modalities in the exploitation of shepherds. The Catholic Church continued to be the largest landowner through its haciendas and "cofradías" system. Haciendas such as Chaca, in the heights of Huanta, or Ayrabamba and Ayzarca in Cangallo, or the SAIS and Granjas Comunales in Huancavelica and Andahuaylas, are some examples of landownership and the evolution of semi-feudalism. It was proverbial that in the case of Huanta, for example, peasants had never obtained a favorable resolution from judges to prevent the usurpation of their lands and violent eviction, which, as in the heights of the San José district, meant judicial attack and aggression against peasant owners, the burning of their huts, and the theft of their products, forcing them to live in caves for years.

On the other hand, in its mission to defend the current system and its logic of attack against the Communist Party of Peru, the so-called Truth and Reconciliation Commission affirms in its "Final Report" that when the PCP entered the zone (referring to the La Mar province), the hacienda system had completely disappeared, and that its dismantling would have occurred as a result of the 1965 guerrilla, the agrarian reform of the 1970s, and the "land seizure" by Vanguardia Revolucionaria in 1974, and that therefore "the subversive group... embarked on an unjust armed struggle against the democratic state..." These are false, absurd, incoherent, and contradictory statements that aim to deny the peasant base of the People's War and its action to sweep away semi-feudalism. The idealistic pretension that old regimes fall by themselves, and that a revolutionary process is not required to overthrow them, is simply speculation or the cunning of its servants to divert the target of the Democratic Revolution.

In 1965, the action of the ELN in Bejar, not the MIR, in the province of La Mar, Ayacucho, was short-lived

and lasted only three months. It was limited to the annihilation of the landowner Carrillo, the owner of the Chapi estate. The ELN was immediately almost completely destroyed by the army. While the ELN expressed the struggle of our people from a petty-bourgeois point of view and showed the feasibility of armed struggle, it had serious problems with bourgeois militarist line, was not linked to the peasantry due to distrust and a belief in themselves as redeemers. What is strange is that in this case, the so-called CVR (Truth and Reconciliation Commission) praises it as a "great movement," which "has been engraved in the memory of the inhabitants," which "liberated them from oppression and gamonal abuse," and uses that to oppose and attack the Communist Party, which it describes as a "criminal action." Such appreciation proves its total lack of objectivity, and its subjective partiality is due to the old revolutionary petty-bourgeois political ideas of its commissioners and supporters.

Regarding the application of the agrarian law of Velasco Alvarado in the 1970s, let's say that first, it fully proved the subsistence of semi-feudalism. Second, it was another law of buying and selling, which maintained servile forms of exploitation, fostered large associative property, implemented bureaucratic systems of administration and direct control of the state over land income, while facilitating and promoting the penetration of bureaucratic capitalism in the countryside and new modalities of land concentration, which means the usurpation of land from poor peasants, their ruin, and expulsion

from the countryside. In Ayacucho, there was no significant variation, in Huancavelica, it meant the greatest concentration of several latifundia into one of more than 60,000 hectares, the so-called SAIS Huancavelica, and in Apurímac, after the "land takeovers" promoted by Vanguardia Revolucionaria in 1974 and the signing of the Toxama and Huancahuacho Acts between the Government and VR, they served by mutual agreement to drain the massive and thriving peasant struggle in the province of Andahuaylas. This "land takeover" did not serve to liberate or give land to the peasantry but to apply the corporative plans of the fascist government to evolve semi-feudalism by following the landlord path in the countryside.

3. The entire process of the Reconstitution, the struggle of two decades under the Great Leadership and personal direction of Chairman Gonzalo and the Red Fraction, made it possible to have a new type of Party prepared to initiate the People's War and lead it to the conquest of Power throughout the country. In this process, a historical contingent was forged armed with the ideology of the proletariat, and with the direction of Chairman Gonzalo, it was ready to assume the conquest of Power through the People's War.

Let's take what is proposed to us about the third moment of the Party, which starts from 1980 onwards, in the fundamental document on the Military Line:

"In the third moment of the Party... the application and development of the path is embodied: this third moment has four mile-

stones:

- 1. Definition
- 2. Preparation
- 3. Start
- 4. Development of the guerrilla war"
- 1. **Definition.** "Essentially, the Party made the historic and transcendental decision to initiate people's war in Peru, which was defined in the 9th Extended Plenum of June 1979. This decision was achieved amidst three intense struggles: the first against the right-wing opportunist line that opposed starting armed struggle by denying the revolutionary situation, the existence of conditions, and claiming 'stability'; they were expelled and the Party agreed to a new stage and a new goal. The second struggle was against a new right-wing line that considered initiating armed struggle to be impossible, a 'dream,' and claimed that there was no need to make that decision because it was a matter of principle. The third struggle was against divergences on the left, in which nuances on how to develop people's war were seen. It was established that the proletarian nuance was that of Chairman Gonzalo and therefore it was the one that should prevail. The entire Party made a commitment to be guided by the leadership of Chairman Gonzalo. Regarding the construction of the armed forces, the decision was made to form military cadres. own groups for action, and undermine reactionary

1.1 The Beginning and Development of the People's War in Ayacucho

forces by targeting soldiers. In terms of strategy and tactics, the organic system was rethought." ¹⁴

The historic agreement of ILA, Initiate the Armed Struggle, generated a vigorous and feverish movement for its implementation. In addition to the broadcast of the 9th Plenary Session and the adoption of specific agreements at all bases and levels, the development of surveys and research is of great importance in defining the regions, surveys and investigations in which Chairman Gonzalo, a good group of university professors, male and female militants, and peasants from the region participated, recognizing the particular characteristics of the area and studying both its historical process and its economic deficiencies and potentialities, concluding that the three departments of Ayacucho, Apurimac, and Huancavelica were a historical unit. Among them, we highlight the important research meetings with peasants in Tayacaja, Huancavelica, the meeting with cadres in Huancavelica itself, the meeting in Ayacucho, and the most important of all with cadres and militants from Andahuaylas-Cangallo, which is defined as the Principal Zonal Committee of the Principal Regional Committee. All of them were developed under the personal direction of Chairman Gonzalo. The report on the research work on the peasant problem presented by comrade Norah, secretary of the Principal Zonal Committee of Andahuaylas-Cangallo, is welcomed and studied by the entire Party; she, as the second member of the Permanent Committee, took over the Zonal Committee to guarantee the Initiation.

2. **Preparation.** "In this milestone, the Party Program, the general political line of the Peruvian revolution, and the party statutes are sanctioned. Political strategy problems related to revolutionary violence, people's war, Party, Army, and United Front are resolved, and the following decision is made: 'Forge the First Company in reality! Let the violence flourish by initiating and developing armed struggle; let us open fire and offer our blood to write the new chapter in the history of the Party and our people, and let us forge the First Company in reality. Peru, December 3, 1979.' The guidelines 'for the people's war, military plans, and the construction of the three instruments and their linkage with the New Power were established.'15 The Start Plan guided by the slogan 'Initiate the Armed Struggle!' was sanctioned, which was the condensation of the main policy that should be militarily implemented. Its contents included, first, political tasks to be fulfilled: initiate armed struggle, boycott elections, promote armed struggle for land and lay the foundations of the new, especially Power; second, forms of struggle: guerrilla warfare, sabotage, armed propaganda and agitation, selective annihilation with or without modern weapons: third, a schedule: the start date and duration of the Plan, simultaneous actions for

specific dates; fourth, slogans: 'Armed Struggle!', 'Workers' and Peasants' Government!' and 'Down with the new reactionary government!' "16

At the Regional workplace, the retransmission of the partisan events that took place in this process is fulfilled: the First National Conference (November-December 1979), the Second Plenary Session of the Central Committee (17-28 March 1980) and the First Military School of the Party (2-19 April 1980), to comply with the militarization of the Party and strengthen the work with new displacements. "The preparation was given in the struggle against the rightist positions that denied conditions and said that the Party was not prepared or that the masses were not going to support us, deserting the head of these positions which were crushed." ¹⁷

3. On May 17th, 1980, the Communist Party of Peru initiated the People's War, guided by Marism-Leninism-Maoism, Gonzalo Thought, to Conquer Power for the class and the people, and build the People's Republic of New Democracy; and it captures the third milestone, called the "Beginning," "Thus, the class struggle of the proletariat and the people of Peru have taken a leap in its long journey. The political struggle continues as revolutionary war... In this manner our party left behind a historical baggage, more than 50 years old, and has overcome a dark and rotten electorialism imposed on the masses. With dy-

namite and bullets it began to write the genuine people's liberation, armed and united from the beginning with the people, mainly the peasants, who have always supported the most heroic actions of the Peruvian revolution, "18 proving from the beginning its guerrilla essence and that it is people's war, not terrorism, being Ayacucho, Huancavelica and Apurimac the main battlefield between armed revolution and counter-revolution, above all Avacucho, the constant and heroic forge, beautiful land where the people with proletarian mind and peasant arms, as a result of all the intense preparatory work gave life and saw the new come true, where precisely the poor peasantry more than anyone else heroically offered their generous blood, and it is with the masses of this region as we will see later, that the genocide of the reactionary state has been sinister and insatiable through its Armed Forces, Police Forces and Complementary Forces.

The third milestone lasted throughout the year 1980, with two plans successfully fulfilled: Start the Armed Struggle (May to July 1980) and Boost the Guerrilla Warfare (July to December 1980). This solved the problem of how to start the armed struggle, from peacekeepers to warfighters, the militarization of the Party through actions and the masterful Initiation Plan was key. It happened to capture the policy tasks set by the Party, that is: initiating the armed struggle, boycotting the elections, armfully promoting the peasant strug-

gle for land and laying the foundations of the new, especially the new power by raising the slogans: "Armed Struggle," "Government of workers and peasants" and "Down with the reactionary government," through the military organic forms: detachments and platoons with or without modern weapons and the various forms of struggle, guerrilla actions of: propaganda and agitation, mobilizations, harvests and invasions, sabotage, assault and confrontation, mainly in the countryside, highlighting the milestones of the armed boycott in Chuschi, the action that began the People's War, and the forceful blows to gamonalismo in Ayrabamba and Ayzarca, shaking the semi-feudal foundations of the state. The first sabotages of pylons, bridges and roads, and assaults on mining camps to confiscate dynamite were also carried out.

It is a specification of the People's War in Peru to make the countryside the main theater of actions and the cities necessary complement. "The beginnings were modest, almost without modern weapons, it was fought, advanced and built from the small to the large and from the weak material initial fire became the great turbulent and roaring fire that expands sowing revolution and exploding more impetuous people's war." ¹⁹

4. Deeply rooted in the peasant masses, mainly poor of Ayacucho, applying the "three withs:" living with the masses, working with the masses, and

fighting with the masses, the People's War raising and intensifying guerrilla actions further, went on to develop the fourth milestone: Development of the Guerrilla Warfare, "A plan was fulfilled that lasted from May 1981 to December 1982 and has a previous period, of January 1981, Opening guerrilla zones based on Support Bases;" implied an ideological-political leap by putting Marxism-Leninism-Maoism as the basis of party unity, the guiding thought of Chairman Gonzalo; Militarily, the guerrillas opened up like a fan throughout the country. "Conquering weapons and means, moving the field with armed actions and Batting to advance towards the Support Bases," partial plans fulfilled being the last "Bat." the link with the following plan; progress was made in destroying feudal relations of production by targeting gamonalismo as the spearhead and combating joint police operations; a multitude of assaults on police posts and selective annihilations of the gamonal power were carried out, generating a great mobilization of peasant masses who joined the militias, giving rise to a vacuum of power of reaction and thus arise and multiply the People's Committees. They appear like this and the Support Bases are specified."20

From this period we highlight some of the most important actions in the four forms of struggle and the different procedures. In bold guerrilla combats and direct blows against the police forces, the assault on the Ayacu-

cho Prison, in application of the Party's escape policy, where for the first time the Guerrilla Company acted, the city was blockaded and dozens of prisoners of war were taken away; assaults on police posts such as Luricocha, which has been the first, ingenious and intrepid assault using stick machine guns, then continued the assaults on Quinua, Tambo, Quicapata, Totos, Yanaocro, Agchi, San José de Secca, Vilcashuamán among others, to which we must add that all police operations, including those of their special bodies, full of their abuses, outrages and crimes, they were defeated and forced to abandon large areas of the countryside, to take refuge in provincial and departmental capitals, actions that allowed to extract weapons from the enemy, the main source of weapons of the guerrillas, and what is fundamental, to deal hard blows to the very morale of the reactionary state apparatuses and their contingent, as well as assaults on mines for the confiscation of dynamite and other means. The very important razings, invasions and uprisings of crops, raising in arms the peasantry, the main force of the revolution, which shook the Ayacucho countryside pointing against the semi-feudal bases of reactionary state power in agriculture, as the main target, unloading against them the weight of armed vindictive action, raising the centennial and indesmayable peasant struggle for land, against gamonales of old and new stamp as in Ayrabamba, Ayzarca, Palermo, Toxama, Pincos, Allpachaca, Wayllapampa, Chaca, among many others, and against associative properties, among them, the so-called "Communal Farms" that concentrated the land and in which free labor of the poor peasantry was used, managed and controlled by the local power or State agencies for their benefit, not of the masses, likewise against properties of arrogant lackeys of the distant or absent central Power. A multitude of occupations of villages were made, among them Acosvinchos, Vinchos, Cavara, Pomatambo, Occoruro, Huancasancos, Lucanamarca, Sacsamarca, etc., sowing in the peasantry with deep and generalized campaign of agitation and armed propaganda as no party has ever done in the country, to which is added the seizure of radio stations, flyers, posters and graffiti, of great importance for the indoctrination of the masses in the ideology and policy of the PCP. And the agitation of concrete problems for which the masses struggle, in this way massive mobilizations of tens of thousands of masses and the progressive incorporation and organization of the mainly poor peasantry in the Party, guerrillas and organizations of the New Power Front were concretized.

A multitude of actions of sabotage to electric lights, banks, premises and public entities such as courts, governorates, labor headquarters, and tax offices, electoral registries, municipalities and premises of People's Action in cities and districts, as well as blowing up bridges and roads, all of them within the political objective of economically hitting the Peruvian State, undermining and generating vacuum to the functioning of the reactionary Power, as well as hindering their plans and military operations.

Within the same political objectives of the People's

War, selective annihilations have also been made to those who were directly condemned by the masses: arrogant gamonales and gamonalillos, recalcitrant representatives of the local Power, known oppressors and enemies of the people, counter-revolutionary black heads and notorious repressive agents massacrers of combatants, in the countryside executed in People's Trials after being discussed in People's Assemblies.

In this regard, the specific policy established by the PCP, which has guided the selective annihilations is very clear and expressly indicates against whom to target and on popular trials and Jury:

"Seek to solve land problems by uniting the whole and dividing the reaction. Apply that policy with patience, if they have won, undermine them and corner the crooks.

Our problem is to unite the poor, the poor never against the poor, the people never against the people."²¹

"Apply class politics in the community. The reaction applies a plan with landlords and rich peasants who want the land for themselves, we apply dividing them and annihilating the most recalcitrant." ²²

"Regarding popular trials, consider whether the existence of a jury is not convenient, which is a group of people who judge as a collective conscience, thus, it is

the people themselves who judge as a collective conscience."²³

Thus, the fiery People's War began and developed in the poorest rural areas of the country, mainly in the provinces of Huamanga, Huanta, La Mar, Cangallo, and Víctor Fajardo in the department of Ayacucho, as well as in Huancavelica and the province of Andahuaylas, Apurímac, a region where since the 1960s, as previously mentioned, the PCP militants under the leadership of the Red Fraction, led by Chairman Gonzalo, built a strong bond with the poor masses of the countryside. Within this context is the current province of Huancasancos (until 1994 it was part of Víctor Fajardo), in the central-western part of Ayacucho, an area mainly dedicated to livestock production located at an altitude of over 3.000 meters. The governmental organization called the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVR) absurdly claimed that "this is not an area where there was a struggle for land," in an ignorant attempt to deny the basic problem of semifeudalism, which is essentially the political manifestation of gamonalismo, and the problem of land, which is the driving force behind the class struggle in the countryside, sustained by multiple forms of servile relationships. This was an attempt to deny the causes and undermine the foundations of the People's War during the Agrarian War period and to falsely accuse "the subversive group... of launching an unjust armed struggle against the democratic state." ²⁴

In the districts of Sancos, Lucanamarca, and Sacsamarca in the province of Huancasancos, the secular

semi-feudal system and gamonalismo, consisting of oppressive gamonalillos, bosses, and lackeys, held hegemony over politics and the mechanisms of the state. They exploited and oppressed the peasant masses through a regime of servitude in its various forms, indulging in all kinds of abuses, concentrating lands with numerous herds, and seizing properties through the local power with the support and backing of the entire reactionary state power network. The root of this gamonalismo and semi-feudal property system was attacked by mobilizing thousands of poor peasant farmers from communities throughout the area such as Lucanamarca, Huancasancos, Sacsamarca, Sarhua, Tiquihua, Manchiri, Umaru, Hualla, Pampacangallo, Carapo, Portacruz, among others. They, under the direction of the PCP, concretized Committees of Distribution, the germ of the New Power, in the destruction of Associatives, "Communal Farms," in Sacsamarca and Caracha in Sancos, of thousands of heads of livestock, and to the properties of abusive gamonalillos like Antenor Molina in Sancos, who owned eight estates, 1,800 sheep, 80 cattle, 120 alpacas, and two stores. Marciano Huancahuari in Lucanamarca, hated by the masses, was a lifelong boss who had passed through all the positions in the local power structure without interruption and used it to become one of the people with the most pastures and livestock. He mistreated his shepherds and abused his neighbors by seizing their lands with forged documents. All of this was an insult in an area of extreme poverty, which is the other side where the poor, who are the vast majority,

had little or no land. This can be corroborated by statements made by old authorities from Lucanamarca in the 1980s who were called as witnesses in the "Megaproceso," who said that there were "people who have nothing, only passing their lives as peons." The shepherds in the estates, who dedicated 24 hours a day of their entire family's work to this, earned 60 soles a month at that time. It is well known that in the countryside, out of every three farmers who can work, only one works, and this unemployed labor force is channeled under servile relationships such as free labor and other feudal modalities, such as sharecropping, by gamonalismo. Therefore, these destruction actions were long-awaited, and hundreds of peasants, "approximately between 800 to 1000 people" in the case of Lucanamarca, participated in them, as declared by the former mayor Gualberto Tacas Rojas in the "Megaproceso." By the way, in that district, Marciano Huancahuari was the only one whose livestock was destroyed, not "everyone who had more." as the PCP is accused of to discredit them. proven by the statement in the "Megaproceso" by Mrs. Edda Huaripaucar in that regard. The destruction of livestock, goods, and land benefited thousands of the poorest, who directly made their fundamental demand against gamonalismo a reality.

In summary, the process of developing the People's War advanced by transforming the countryside, striking decisively at the semi-feudal relations of exploitation and oppression, defeating the police forces, undermining the landlord power, causing the authorities of the old

power to resign massively, leading to a power vacuum for the reaction. It is in these conditions that the People's Committees and Support Bases arise and multiply in the Department of Ayacucho, during and mainly at the end of 1982, but as a precedent from 1980, the Distribution Committees had already emerged, composed of peasants appointed by the masses to lead the distribution of goods and livestock during the raids.

In the case of the various towns in the province of Huancasancos, the People's Committees arise and begin to march in the last months of 1982, becoming part of the Support Base System of the People's War. In Sancos, Sacsamarca, and Lucanamarca, as happened throughout the Ayacuchan countryside, as a result of the long process of peasant work developed since the sixties and mainly by the heat of the revolutionary war, the PCP was deeply rooted and had won the conscious support of the vast majority of the poorest of the peasantry, counting on native militants, fighters organized in militias, embodying the construction of the New Power, People's Committees integrated by five commissioners, so-called to highlight their status as Commissioners, removable at any time. As a system of the State, they were formed as a dictatorship of New Democracy, a United Front Committee that embodies the joint dictatorship of workers, peasants, and petty bourgeoisie, under the hegemony of the proletariat, for the direction of the Party, respecting the interests of the national bourgeoisie (rich peasants in the countryside). As a system of government, power was exercised through Peo-

ple's Assemblies, in which everyone exercised the right to express opinions, elect, judge, or sanction, applying New Democracy, true democracy, also using dictatorship and coercion against the enemies of the people, sustained by the revolutionary armed forces. Progress was made in organizing the social life of the masses in all areas, in production orienting activity towards collective work, favoring the poorest, mainly; trade, bartering, and pack animal transport were organized; and true justice was exercised, health, education, and recreation were organized, as well as ensuring the functioning of popular organizations and collective and individual security against the enemy. In this way, the most profound mobilization, politicization, organization, and arming of the masses by the PCP was embodied as no other party has ever done.

In summary, the emergence and progress of the New Power in Ayacucho and later in different regions of the country has been a material reality, an unprecedented event that has given rise to new social relations of production guided by a just and correct party policy; an authentic popular power that the masses have already tasted, know, and lived, and they will never forget it! However, since classes and class struggle do not disappear when the People's Committee is established, what we will see is their greater ferocity, due to the fact that the exploiting classes, the overthrown landlordism, will fiercely resist and scheme the destruction of the New Power and the restoration of their old power, under the plan and direction of the genocidal Armed Forces.

Thus, since 1983, the war has been about restoration-counter-restoration, that is, the counter-revolutionary war to crush the New Power and restore the old one, and the People's War to defend, develop, and build the newly emerged People's Power, a fierce struggle waged between the reactionary Armed Forces and the People's Guerrilla Army.

1.2 The Peruvian State has Been Guided by a Genocidal Policy Throughout its Counter-Subversive War.

The Communist Party of Peru had foreseen that at the beginning of the People's War, the Peruvian state would not find it convenient for the Armed Forces to intervene immediately, as it had been ruling as a military dictatorship for twelve years and left thoroughly discredited. Additionally, there were the contradictions within the reactionary camp, and President Belaunde feared that the military would use their intervention to stage a coup and gradually take over. And so it happened. The Belaunde government decided to combat the People's War as terrorism, following the pattern established by the imperialist master Ronald Reagan, launching its police forces to drown the armed revolution in blood, primarily in the Ayacucho region from the outset. By trampling on the most basic rights, the government unleashed a brutal and bloody counter-revolutionary action against militants, revolutionary fighters, and mainly peasant masses, raiding and looting homes, murdering, stealing, and setting fire to homes, seeking to intimidate and keep the masses away from the armed struggle. However, contrary to this desire, the counter-revolutionary action fueled the People's War, which spread vigorously not only in Ayacucho but throughout the country.

First, it used its police forces: GC, GR, PIP, and their corresponding anti-subversive bodies: Sinchis, Llapan Atiq, Dircote, etc., with the advice, planning, direction, and logistical support of the Armed Forces, which in the midst of their crimes and violations of fundamental rights, applying the reactionary policy of stealing everything, burning everything, and killing everyone, were defeated and withdrew from the field. All of that brutal, unrestrained action by the anti-subversive police forces obeys the genocidal line and policy that the Peruvian state applied and has guided its counter-subversive war, and is reflected from its very formation.

These sinister anti-subversive police forces, especially in the Ayacucho department, acted worse than during the war with Chile, as denounced by the Communist Party in its documents. They behaved like a true occupying force. The people of Ayacucho, both in rural areas and cities, despised and feared them. Their arbitrary detentions, atrocious tortures, daily disappearances and murders were accompanied by unrestrained arrogance in their drunkenness, fights and scandals everywhere. This was a widespread practice, particularly by the so-called "sinchis," who were seen by the peo-

ple as torturers, rapists, and murderers. During their operations in rural areas, the masses avoided encountering them and withdrew to avoid being killed or having their young girls, even children, savagely raped as a vile and abject means of subjugation. The sinchis even swung them in the air from helicopters, tied by their feet, to force them to give false confessions. These helicopters transported the bodies of the detained, who were then thrown from high altitude into rivers after being tortured and killed. They committed horrendous massacres, such as in Chalcos, Sucre province, Ayacucho, where they drunkenly captured a group of teachers accusing them of being terrorists, and after pressuring them to "run, escape wherever you can," they shot and killed them in September 1982. In Socos, Huamanga, they massacred 34 peasants, including men, women and children, in November 1983. These are just some of the countless crimes perpetrated by these repressive forces.

Despite being militarized, and the counter-subversive doctrine originating from the Armed Forces, they ultimately suffered resounding failures, suffering defeats. In two years and seven months, they could no longer defeat the revolutionary armed forces and withdrew from rural areas to provincial or departmental capitals of the emergency zones.

In the face of the defeat of the police forces and mainly with the emergence of the New Power, Belaúnde's reluctance to the intervention of the Armed Forces was broken. The class necessity of the exploiters and oppressors prevailed, and they entrusted the three branches - Army, Navy, and Air Force - with the restoration of public order with the support of the police forces, putting the regions of Ayacucho, Huancavelica, and Apurímac under a state of emergency and political-military control since December 1982. The operations are carried out under the direction of the Joint Command of the Armed Forces, which acts as ordered by the National Defense Council headed by the President of the Republic. Hence, the direct and unavoidable responsibility of the Peruvian state and its ruling authorities for everything carried out during their tenure.

When the Armed Forces entered, it had been almost three years since they had been studying revolutionary warfare in the country. Furthermore, as we have seen, they advised and planned the actions of the police forces, thus entering with an advantage and obviously having greater and better human and material resources.

The Army Manual on Unconventional Warfare and Counterinsurgency ME 41-7, edited by the Ministry of Defense in 1989, provides solid evidence of the counterinsurgency policy they applied to oppose masses to masses, through the formation of militias, guided by the genocidal policy of the Peruvian State throughout the process of its counter-revolutionary war. It says, "At the national level, the Executive is responsible for the general direction of all counterinsurgency actions in the different fields," and that "the support of the population is necessary for counterinsurgency." For this, the problem consists of finding a favorable active minority and "organizing it to mobilize the neutral ma-

jority against the contrary minority," "identifying the members and organization of the Party... as well as its support bases and local strength," for which they must "optimize infiltration," "form networks of collaborators and informants," "combat... using procedures similar to those of the subversives," "carry out psychological operations," etc. What follows is the "destruction of the Local Administrative Political Organization (OPA)," which is "by definition, (that) the members of the OPA are not armed elements... the objective of total elimination must prevail." Based on these, they proceed to "establish Committees of Self-Defense (CADS)" (pages 58 to 106).

Immediately, he put his plan of using mesnadas into action, which the police had already been advancing, to use masses against masses, following the old imperialist rule of pitting natives against natives. He first used previously selected contingents, prepared among discharged soldiers and the small group of conservative peasants linked to the gamonalismo and cattle rustling. whom he handled as agents and infiltrators within the peasant masses, united to the spy network that they had begun to set up since the 70s. Based on this foundation of agents, infiltrators, spies, and informants, plus the old overthrown authorities, gamonalillos, and lackeys, they formed the mesnadas just as they have written in their Manual: "The problem is to find a favorable active minority" for the counter-revolution, which under the plan and military command, in coordinated actions with police and military operations (whose members also acted disguised as peasants or police officers), unleashed white terror in the countryside, pressuring and subduing the masses, carrying out cruel massacres, torture, rape, theft, looting, and arson, behaving like a true occupying force against militants, fighters, leaders of the New Power, and advanced masses, members or linked to the PCP, applying the sinister policy of killing everyone, stealing everything, and burning everything.

The PCP in the Expanded Session of the Central Committee in November 1985 evaluates the entry of the Armed Forces, their genocidal intervention, and the counter-subversive policy of opposing masses against masses through the formation of mesnadas, concluding:

"With the entrance of the Armed Forces, the situation changed and their objective was to eliminate us. When the Armed Forces entered, they didn't set up a blockade, but rather took strong points and cities like Ayacucho, and mounted operations looking to pressure and utilize certain groups of people, giving rise to the mesnadas. Additionally, they began training civilians in the military, such as Gavilán, and expanded the number of officers. The Army and Navy disguised themselves as peasants and, along with the mesnadas, attacked us in the northern and southern parts of the CRP (Main Regional Committee). The first attack was in Huambo, Huaychao, Iquicha, and Uchuraccay. In response to these events, Belaunde saluted the peasants who had acted against us, thus taking responsibility for the killings. They applied a plan developed by the Navy, advised by Yankee imperialism and carried out by the Army, thinking that by using certain groups of people they could separate us from the masses and take positions." ²⁵

The policy of one village against another was the state policy followed from the beginning of the countersubversive war. This plan of mesnadas was already being applied with the Sinchis and the "Llapan Atiq" as a test in the La Mar province, in the Chungui and "Oreja de Perro" areas, at the end of 1982. They committed abuses and outrages in the towns where the PCP began to organize the New Power, detaining, cruelly torturing, conducting raids usurping the name of the Communist Party and committing massacres. They pressured the masses, forcing them to organize into "rondas" in Mollebamba and Orongov, Pallgas, Ninabamba and Santa Carmen. With the "ronderos" of Mollebamba, the "Llapan Atiq" of Andahuavlas incursioned into Orongov where they detained a peasant, tortured him by removing his nails and cutting his tongue in the presence of the population, hanging his body on a post of the school, they did it to punish and pressure them to organize into "rondas." In January 1983, they massacred 40 peasants in the temple of Pallqas and blamed the PCP for this act, then they forced them to organize into "rondas." Subsequently, based on mesnadas, the Sinchis and later the Army, unleashed white terror and genocide, literally destroying the towns of the entire area, leaving them empty, disappearing them. The hundreds of thousands of displaced persons are a direct result of these acts of the genocidal counter-revolutionary war, which in the following years generalized throughout the country, applying the method of "drying up the pond to kill the fish," that is, isolating the guerrilla from its mass base.

The underlying problem, the political and military fact that the Peruvian State and the so-called Truth Commission deliberately hide, twist and falsify for the interest and position of the counter-revolutionary class, is the process of restoring the old power that the armed force has prepared and developed through those supposed "peasant uprisings" that are nothing but the genocidal counter-revolutionary action of mesnadas led by the riffraff of old authorities, lackeys, and others linked to the gamonalism overturned from power, since the class struggle and resistance of the overthrown exploiters, in the face of the emergence of the New Power, became extremely fierce, as they take advantage of the force of custom and traditions of the old society, the long experience of the State in military, economic, and Power management. As a counterpart, the PCP has developed a response to quell it, a counter-establishment of the lost New Power, through a heroic popular war of mainly poor peasants, defending, developing, and building People's Committees and Support Bases, a process in which as a negative aspect, limitations, errors, and excesses have been presented as isolated facts, but never as Party policy. Only by looking within this historical framework

of the war can the events be correctly understood. To reduce it to a set of facts of a supposed peasant "rebellion" against the popular war is to cover up the historical truth to exculpate the genocidal policy of the State and the Armed Forces.

Well then. On January 28, 1983, they formed groups in Acobamba, and on February 14 in the community of Colcabamba, Tayacaja province, both in Huancavelica, adjacent to Huanta. However, they focused on the northern and central-western parts of the Ayacucho department, in Huanta and Huancasancos respectively.

In the communities located in the highlands of Huanta, at almost 4000 meters above sea level, strategic points due to their location between the valleys and the jungle eyebrow of Ayacucho, from where the popular war expanded uncontrollably, the Marine infantry that took control of the province, promoted the organization of secret groups in all the towns where People's Committees had emerged and where they were Support Bases for the People's War. Various events prove the existence of a permanent coordination of elements of the overthrown local power, especially graduates, with the Political-Military Command of Huanta and Ayacucho, and with the Sinchis of Tambo, in addition to the presence of marines and Sinchis who acted disguised as peasants, organizing and directing the mob of counter-revolutionaries.

In Uchuraccay, the old authorities have already begun to plot clandestinely since October 1982, promoted by individuals like Fortunato Gavilan, the lieutenant-governor, who were prepared in advance by the Armed

Forces to oppose and act against the guerrilla. In that same month, these counter-revolutionary elements of local power decided to detain six guerrillas for assassination, but the majority of the masses in assembly opposed it and let them go. Similar counter-revolutionary activity of plotting, coordination, and aggregation of blackheads of reactionary elements against the People's War also unfolded in other communities in the area, machinations that were denounced by the masses before the PCP, and their most recalcitrant and active heads in Uchuraccay and Huaychao were tried and sentenced to death in popular trials in December 1982. With the entry of the Armed Forces in late December, and of the Navy in the province of Huanta, they focused on the organization of Mesnadas with the aim of striking and ending the guerrillas. They intensified military operations and patrols of marines and Sinchis that entered all communities, including Uchuraccay and Huaychao, pressuring with threats to kill the entire population if they did not kill any stranger who arrived on foot. The statements of the villagers in Uchuraccay on repeated occasions before the journalist Luis Morales, published by the Diario de Marka before the so-called Vargas Llosa commission and testimonies before the court and during the oral trial of the Uchuraccay Process, reveal the genocidal plan put into action by the Navy and the Sinchis from the first days of January: "they have come in helicopters... and they have told us: take out the eyes, the tongue, of people who are not known, who are enemies," "we will not come by land, only by helicopter. And if any stranger comes by land, they will kill him." It is the order that they gave publicly in all communities, simultaneously advancing in organizing and coordinating the action of the Mesnadas, with the old authorities of Uchuraccay coordinating and leading, thus unfolding several inter-community clandestine meetings of old authorities from Uchuraccay, Huaychao, Cunya, Paria, Qarhuauran, Pampalca, and other communities in the first days of January, in which they agree to put into action the genocidal plan of the Armed Forces to perpetrate a ruthless massacre of PCP militants, guerrilla fighters and militias, and New Power commissioners everywhere.

The horrendous, cowardly and treacherous massacres began in Huaychao. On January 15, 1983, the groups from Huaychao and Macabamba, following the plan outlined by the Navy, "went out to greet the guerrillas and led them to their assembly hall... listened to their speeches... then calmly approached the Senderistas, took out the axes, knives and stones they had hidden under their ponchos and beat 7 of the 8 subversives to death." ²⁶ In the following days, with the same cruelty, the groups from Uchuraccay killed 5 guerrillas. In total, only in the third week of January, in the different highland communities of Huanta, 24 PCP fighters were atrociously massacred. At the same time, "the authorities of the communities coordinate the patrolling of the area, establishing surveillance systems from the tops of the hills, using horns as alarm signals and sleeping on the slopes of the mountains," as even the self-proclaimed

CVR has recorded,²⁷ seeking to exalt all that barbaric action of the groups, which it calls a "multicomunal rebellion" against the PCP, falsifying the facts to cover up the plan and responsibility of the Peruvian State and Armed Forces, when all these events clearly show that the masses, under the control of the groups, within the Navy's plan, were subjected to militarization.

On January 23, the atrocious massacres were cynically hailed, justified and publicly supported by General Noel and President Belaúnde himself, who not only endorsed but called for genocide, praising it as an "example of patriotism." On the same day, Noel sent military patrols by land and air, bringing food to these communities "as recognition from President Belaúnde for the actions taken" against the Communist Party of Peru, ²⁸ but part of the masses in these towns rejected this insolence as it deserved. They reiterated the order to the groups to continue with this type of action, "killing anyone who arrived at the community on foot," as the villagers of Uchuraccay declared to journalist Luis Morales, a story published in the Diario de Marka.

On January 26, 8 journalists who were heading towards Huaychao to uncover the truth about the barbaric massacres, since public opinion doubted the official information given by General Noel (foreign journalists said: "Here we are seeing things that we have only seen in Vietnam," similarly Virgilio Roel declared: "the Sendero has won over many indigenous communities to their cause... that is why the anti-subversive struggle applied in Vietnam and perfected by them has

been adopted. The method consists of using the populations themselves against the guerrilla insurgency)," ²⁹ were treacherously and cowardly assassinated in Uchuraccay, along with the guide Juan Argumedo and Severino Huascar Morales, a community member of the area, causing a serious political scandal for the Peruvian government and revealing to the world the genocidal plan of the Armed Forces to use mobs and pit masses against masses in the counter-revolutionary war.

During those days, the magazine Equis published that the Sinchis were being trained in a US military base in anti-guerrilla warfare, and that it was part of a "psychological" plan being implemented by the Sinchis directly advised by the CIA, which had captured the National Intelligence Service directly under the control of Belaunde's presidency (that is why Huaychao and Uchuraccay was a plan originated from the presidency of the Republic itself). The article also suggests that the GC (Civil Guard) and everyone else knew that the journalists were going to that area; they passed three checkpoints where they were registered. Half an hour later, a group of Sinchis led by a lieutenant headed towards Huaychao, where they conspired with Gavilán and others to kill the journalists. In addition, the sister of the guide Argumedo reported seeing a dark-skinned man giving orders, and photos taken by the journalists themselves prove that Sinchis acted disguised as locals.

Regarding this, the "Investigative Commission" chaired by Mr. Vargas Llosa blamed the Uchuraccay villagers for the journalists' massacre, scandalously covering up and exculpating the government and the Armed Forces' responsibility. However, during the oral trial on the Uchuraccay case, the Special Court in charge of the process found the **presence of military and police personnel in Uchuraccay on the day of the massacre**, after four years based on overwhelming and undeniable facts and testimonies.

In 1983, the PCP stated: "In Uchuraccay, they have used infiltrating a group and moving a 'town' against another, but the plan has backfired with the murder of the eight journalists." 30

On January 27, the groups in Uchuraccay had a meeting with their peers from Huaychao, Cunya, Paria, Qarhuaurán, Pampalca, and other communities, attended by around three hundred disguised yellow shirts, cattle rustlers, and Sinchis, so not all the attendees were part of the masses. Some of them went to Iquicha where they detained 14 peasants considered sympathizers of the PCP: cruelly beaten, they were taken to Uchuraccay where Fortunato Gavilán threatened to kill them by turning them into "chicharrones." They were put on trial, and divergences arose among the black heads: some believed they should not kill everyone, they could not kill fellow villagers, and they ended up sentencing two to death. The groups pressured other communities under threat to act similarly against the PCP. Regarding these events, during the II Plenary Session of the Central Committee-Expanded of the PCP, they defined:

"We are going to respond measure by measure and the interest of the masses will weigh heavily." (page 35)

"If we thoroughly develop agrarian policy, if the group strikes against those squads, we will receive the support of the masses. The group must unite with the masses, denounce the Sinchis, the Army that directs it, and annihilate the infiltrators part by part." (Page 67).

Immediately after the death of the journalists, the Military Political Command of Ayacucho prohibited all journalism access to rural areas with the clear objective of hiding the genocidal frenzy and bloodshed in the Ayacucho countryside by the troops and armed forces who continued to operate with a carte blanche and total impunity. How many barbarically murdered were hidden and remain forgotten to this day? The immediate reaction of several communities in that area has been to reject the genocidal action of the troops. For example, communities in Acco, Balcon, etc., have prevented Uchuraccay from passing through to Tambo, which expressed the popular reaction, proving that the troops were nothing but groups of yellow-bellied bandits, the sector of conservative or reactionary peasants.

In the southern part of Ayacucho, the first massacre using troops was in Huambo. But it is in the current province of Huancasancos, in Sacsamarca, Sancos and Lucanamarca, where the greatest frenzy and bitterness of the class struggle will be expressed, the bloody confrontation of the old power of gamonalismo overthrown against the emerging New Power. It is the same

counter-revolutionary plan: a group of old authorities overthrown, licensed, gamonalillos and lackeys, in a process of constant relationship and coordination with the Armed Forces were secretly grouped and organized into troops in those towns. And once this phase was completed, they began cruel killings against Party militants, Commissioners, militiamen, advanced masses and their families, with the express objective of destroying the People's Committees, punishing, intimidating, pressuring and subduing the masses, decapitating the social base of the rural revolutionary war, in treacherous simultaneous and coordinated actions with military-police forces and troops. This is irrefutably demonstrated by the statements given by the former authorities of Lucanamarca in the Megaproceso. They have not been able to hide facts that were totally evident, such as the fact that since the entry of the Armed Forces, they had contact, meetings, and constant coordination with General Noel himself, the anti-subversive bases in Huancapi and Huancasancos, and with military and police patrols in operations against the Support Base, and pressured and forced the masses to organize themselves in rondas and participate in the genocide:

> "Before, I had taken memorials to Huamanga... the decision we made (to group ourselves into mesnadas) was based on the verbal explanation of General Noel."

"...the soldiers who came told us to organize ourselves as best we could... we organized ourselves based on the verbal instructions of the soldiers... those who were not part of Sendero made a summit assembly between Huancasancos, Sacsamarca, and Lucanamarca."

"...we were not going to wait for the Army to kill us like any animal, because we were already indicated as subversives, all reds, they even burned houses, that was the objective of the Army and the combined forces, so we had to organize ourselves..."

"(authorities and graduates) We had to contradict Sendero's policy, and we had to organize ourselves clandestinely to face them... (otherwise) the Army would sweep us away." ³¹

In a coordinated manner, they unleashed massacres in the three districts of Huancasancos. In Sacsamarca, the group, after conspiring a "clandestine resistance plan" on February 15, killed Walter Huaccachi and Eladio Laccsa, People's Committee Commissioners. They embedded a crowbar in their stomachs, then stoned them to death. They also detained a number of militiamen who were disappeared. Newspapers at the time reported eight massacred. Simultaneously, the group sent a commission to Huancapi to report to the Army.

On February 16, the Army raided Sancos aboard 3 helicopters with Sacsamarca groups as guides. They left forces in different points and entered the village firing indiscriminately at the masses gathered in the People's Assembly. The newspapers then reported forty dead,

and a villager said: "they killed anyone without any explanation." It was a massacre to punish them, then they proceeded to restore the old power by appointing old authorities among the black heads and threatened the population with an ultimatum, ordering the killing of the new authorities of the People's Committee and the leaders of the militia; otherwise, they would face the Army's response.

On February 20, mixed forces of the army, Sinchis, and militias arrived in two trucks in Lucanamarca while a crowd was gathered for a People's Assembly with a contingent of PCP fighters. A confrontation ensued and seventeen people were killed, according to testimony from the former secretary of that municipality, who also said, "we already knew that someone was going to die, so we took our time getting to the square," 32 demonstrating once again the coordination between the army and the militias. Even the so-called CVR has documented that the army entered with the "support of some sectors of the population," in addition to recording the deaths of twenty-five guerrillas. While there are reports of a confrontation, there were no reports of any wounded or prisoners. The army restored the old power structure with the "black heads" and ordered the killing of Oligario Curitumay, the Commissioner of the People's Committee. Otherwise, the army would ravage the population.

Starting on February 20, the militias from Sancos and Sacsamarca unleashed white terror and began persecuting militiamen, commissioners, and the masses, going from house to house, carrying out massacres, and burning huts. In Sancos, there was a confrontation between the militias and local militia fighters who resisted and fought against the counter-revolutionary offensive. The so-called Truth Commission narrates the ferocity with which the militias acted in this confrontation, seeking to praise them. They moved a group of pressured masses, including women, who were "the ones who initiated the stone-throwing." It is important to note that the militias were armed, as proven by a testimony collected by the Commission: "...they killed one of them, then a girl, and that's where they took advantage of **shooting** J.L.L... he was already injured, and then they followed him and tore him apart." ³³ The bodies of those killed were thrown into a ravine, but the next day the army arrived and ordered them to be buried in a mass grave without knowing how many had been killed. The socalled CVR celebrated these events, saying that from that moment on, "new authorities were elected, beginning a new stage in the history of Huancasancos, in which the formalization of the alliance between the army and the community stands out," that is, the restoration of the old power structure. Thus, the Commission created by the exploitative state, called the "Truth and Reconciliation Commission," highlights in many parts here how it endorses the genocidal policy of the state carried out by its police, military, and complementary forces. Here, it is obvious that it endorses the fact that the masses were forced and compelled to participate as cannon fodder in the counter-revolutionary war.

In the following days, combined forces of the army and the Sinchis, along with their militias, carried out a true hunt, perpetrating disappearances and massacres of relatives, militiamen, and authorities of the New Power in the area. Some of these incidents are of public knowledge: on February 21, four people disappeared; on February 24, joint military forces in a ground and helicopter operation killed five peasants and buried them at Marita Bridge, Sancos. On the same day, Gilver Curitumay, 16 years old and Oligario's brother, disappeared. On February 26, the army killed Hugo Calderon and an unspecified number of community members in Pallqa. On February 28, combined forces, along with a group of militias, carried out a massacre of nineteen militiamen in Lucanamarca. Regarding this execrable act, former Governor Timoteo Huaripaucar said in the Megaproceso: "Those of us who have been against Sendero have been there participating in the confrontation," "On February 27, I already knew that the army was in Huancasancos and the subversives were in Lucanamarca, so we sent a messenger to warn them to come, and they came with that warning." 34

On March 22, the militias, after capturing Oligario Curitumay on his farm, forced the pressured masses to participate and brutally killed him, making his entire family witness it: "bound and blindfolded... they beat him with sticks, pulled his hair until he became unconscious, 'half-dead.' Then they put his body on a pile of ichu, poured kerosene on him, and set him on fire," a savage way of burning that was widespread in the Armed

Forces and militias, and which they accused the revolutionaries of doing. We must also add and take note of the letter addressed to Belaunde by Amnesty International regarding the state's counter-subversive war in Huancasancos during those days. In it, it says: "Amnesty International has received information about a large number of deaths that appeared to have been extrajudicial executions carried out by joint military forces... in the adjacent districts of Lucanamarca, Sacsamarca, Huancasancos...," "...community members from the districts assisted security services in the capture and death of guerrillas...," "There is no news of any prisoners...," "Available information suggests that the majority of alleged members or collaborators of 'Sendero Luminoso' detained on that date were interrogated and then extrajudicially executed...," "Press reports from March 26 informed about the massacre of 18 militants of 'Sendero Luminoso' in the three districts at the hands of community members..."

1.3 The Armed Clashes of Lucanamarca and Others Stifled the Counter-Revolutionary Plan of Using Mesnadas

Like many intellectuals who are far from being communists or revolutionaries, such as Eduardo Toche, for example, they report that the mass killing began with the entry of the Armed Forces in December 1982. Accord-

ing to a "General Information" report from Amnesty International on November 1, 1994, it says: "Since January 1983, Amnesty International has been receiving information, including detailed reports and testimonies of torture, 'disappearances,' and widespread extrajudicial executions at the hands of members of the security forces. The organization has documented the cases of at least 4,200 people who 'disappeared' after being arrested by the security forces. Several thousand others have died at the hands of state forces in extrajudicial executions, at least 500 in 19 separate massacres documented by the organization."

Indeed, the Peruvian State's greatest genocidal policy, implemented through its armed forces, was carried out in 1983 and 1984 with the political objective of restoring its authority and gamonal power, which had been completely challenged in rural areas due to the emergence of 200 People's Committees. This was a serious problem of undeniable political power loss for the State, which led to their desperation. Their military plans aimed to exterminate the PCP and the guerrilla forces by applying genocide and sweeping them away by organizing mesnadas around the outdated power, falsely pitting people against each other. "But why was genocide applied? To contain the People's War, which began in 1980 and established the New Power in People's Committees by the end of 1982. It was to crush the guerrilla war, to separate the masses from the revolutionary war, to destroy the New Power and prevent its development, and to prevent the development of the People's War. To achieve these reactionary political objectives, the Armed Forces, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, all three in solidarity and with planned distribution of genocidal plans, killed 1,767 sons and daughters of the masses in 1983 and disappeared 730. Until that year, there were only 14 casualties in the masses and no disappearances; in total, 2,497 people were killed from the masses in 1983. And in 1984? The spiral of genocidal policy against the masses increased: 2,522 dead and 2,881 disappeared, a total of 5,403 sons and daughters of the masses were killed. Thus, 1984 was the highest peak of genocide perpetrated by the Armed Forces." ³⁶

Therefore, in the face of the barbaric entry of the Armed Forces and all the atrocities and countless massacres they committed by using mesnadas, those counterrevolutionary blows to restore the old power by subjecting and forcing oppressed masses to support them, mounting surveillance or integrating demolition operations against communities or towns, killing guerrillas or masses, it was in these circumstances that the Communist Party's leadership prepared the response, with the political objective of stopping and breaking all that counterrevolutionary genocidal plan, which was part of the sinister policy of pitting masses against each other by moving mesnadas, which they cynically propagandized as the "peasant rebellion" against the People's War. In the specific case of Lucanamarca, the so-called CVR is forced to record that "it decides to obey the orders of the Army, but also agrees to decisively confront the PCP-SL, and one of the first actions is to resume the system of lookouts."³⁷ In addition, it should be noted that the mesnadas, as the former governor declared in the Megaproceso, gathered weapons: "since we organized ourselves, we recovered old weapons, we knew where they were, and we had to ask for them one by one," that is, they were armed just like in Sancos, this was at the end of February. First, in December 1982, the 9-point Circular drafted by the Permanent Committee was sent to the Party's bases, before the entry of the Armed Forces, the content of which we transcribe below:

"

- 1. The Plan is being implemented successfully; overall the outcome is very successful, which is why the reaction is forced to reconsider their fight against us by aiming for a greater or direct involvement of the armed forces. This demonstrates the failure of all their previous operations.
- 2. It is necessary to firmly and decisively apply the slogan 'Whoever is not afraid of dying cut into a thousand pieces dares to dismantle the emperor' and finalize the Plan while taking into account the new circumstances.
- 3. They must study more and be guided by the 'Two important articles.'

- 4. Take more care of the party and military secrecy, clandestinity, and vigilance.
- 5. We must immediately implement what was agreed upon in the Fifth Session; that is, harass and circle the enemy, looking to strike at their weakest points. Our principle is to strategically despise the enemy and tactically take them into account; firmly adhere to the basic principle of war; apply mobility and surprise more and better, carefully apply relative dispersion to mobilize the masses and concentration to strike, paying very close attention to ensuring that forces can easily concentrate.
- 6. Let's not only strive to maintain a connection with the masses, but we must also develop it, especially with the poor peasantry.
- 7. The key to the ongoing Plan is the planting; now our problem is to mobilize, politicize, organize, and arm the masses for future harvests and new invasions, especially those we have already planted. In general, let's focus on the different specific problems that directly benefit the masses, especially land issues through concrete benefits that

the armed struggle provides, as this is how we can unite the people under our leadership, remembering that the conquest of power is the basic and decisive demand.

- 8. Now is when we must indoctrinate the masses on People's War and its application the most; the peasants themselves are the ones who must assume the armed struggle to develop it.
- 9. Develop a propaganda and agitation campaign on:
 - 1) Uniting the people to crush the new reactionary military operation.
 - 2) Joining the People's Armed Forces.
 - 3) Supporting the Armed Struggle.

In this campaign, we must further expose the reactionary government of Belaunde, point out to the police forces that should not continue serving as cannon fodder, to the soldiers who cannot fight against the people who are their own sons. And what is most important, we must raise our slogans on Armed Struggle!, Government of Workers and Peasants!, Land for those who work it!, No to Concentration Camps!, No to Torture and Rape!, etc. When

denouncing the government, we must emphasize that they are implementing a greater plan of 'killing everyone, burning everything, and stealing everything.' That is why the key is to unite the people, strengthen the popular armed forces and support the armed struggle by applying active defense, because nothing is conquered or defended without a fight.

All of this must be studied and implemented immediately and taken into account for the Complementary Plan. Let us remember what has already been seen: an armed force has only the strength of the society that supports it; the armed force must be strategically despised and tactically taken into account; let us remember that only just wars triumph, that the people's war is invincible, and let us keep in mind what Chairman Mao said: 'Under the leadership of the Communist Party, while there are people, all kinds of miracles can be accomplished.'

Let us crush the new reactionary military operation!

Finishing the great milestone and defeating the enemy, let us march to conquer Bases!

Long live the Guerrilla Warfare!" 38

The entry of the Armed Forces and their direct par-

ticipation implied a qualitative change in the war situation, as anticipated by the Party more than a year in advance at the V Plenum where it was agreed to "be prepared for the probable entry of the Armed Forces to fight against us" and "the problem is to maintain the strategy and vary the tactics;" 39 therefore, the Central Leadership called for an Expanded Central Committee (CCA) in January 1983, and in seventy days it was debated and agreed how to respond to the entry of the Armed Forces, and the response was eminently political: the 4 tasks, 1) Creating the EGP (People's Guerrilla Army) (until that moment there were only platoons, detachments, and militiamen); 2) Creating the People's Republic of New Democracy (RPND) and the Revolutionary Movement for the Defense of the People (MRDP) in the city; 3) Reorganizing the Party to adjust it to the qualitative change, and 4) The II GRAND STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT PLAN OF THE PEOPLE'S WAR: "CONQUERING BASES (OF SUPPORT)" after the 1st: STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT PLAN OF THE BEGINNING 1980-83, with the action of Lucanamarca being part of that response, a strategic highland zone for the military lines laid by the Army in the area. In the midst of the CCA, the Permanent Committee met with the entire Political Bureau, and in the third instance, everything agreed upon was presented to the Expanded Committee, and the entire CCA approved the response. No leader of the CCA was involved in the immediate response, but once agreed upon, it was communicated to the intermediate commands and they applied it. The

way the Central Leadership of the PCP directed, located hundreds of kilometers away, was by establishing policy, strategic plans, and strategic-operational plans, which is what was done at the CCA in 1983. How it was implemented was beyond the scope of the Leadership because it was the specific responsibility of those who applied it.

On January 8, the first strike was decreed in Ayacucho from the clandestine, by armed order of the Party, in support of the People's War and against the entry of the Armed Forces; a city of 80,000 inhabitants was completely paralyzed, with the presence of all three branches of the Armed Forces.

When the Armed Forces unleashed the unbridled massacre with the mesnadas and the reactionary military action, as reported in the newspapers of the time as "killings of Shining Path members" in Huancaraylla, Pariabamba, Huambo, Andarapa (Andahuaylas), Aguayro, Chuschi, Pomabamba (where a peasant was given dynamite in his stomach and blown up), Paccha, Vinchos and Pomacocha, several dozens of people including children were shamefully massacred, to which were added the atrocious killings in the communities in the high part of Huanta; there were also reports of violent confrontations in Huambalpa, Umaru, Huancaraúma, Sacsamarca, Huancasancos and Lucanamarca, where the Army, Sinchis and mesnadas carried out joint operations, shamefully assassinating peasants, militiamen, squad fighters, and New Power Commissioners, with no prisoners reported. "La República" of February 20 reported: "50 terrorists die in Fajardo," "El Observador" on the

same day: "40 guerrillas killed in Ayacucho," and in "Caretas" of April 83: "In February, a succession of fierce clashes, in which the intervention of the public force was decisive, meant a hard setback for Sendero Luminoso. Not only did they lose about 60 guerrillas in combat, but they were eradicated from Huancasancos and Sacsamarca."

The Party leadership, in providing their response, specified a correct policy of differentiation, since in the genocidal plan of pitting masses against masses, there were oppressed masses who were used as cannon fodder and protective shields by mesnadas and repressive forces. The following was proposed:

"Choose the most important points... strike the main leaders, reduce the blow, it is not correct to go and kill everyone, that is acting in a desperate manner and giving the reaction what they want." ⁴⁰

It is important to clarify that it was never said to touch women, much less minors. On the contrary, the party leadership provided directives and guidelines for their proper application:

"Reduce the radius of attack and expand the radius of education. Eliminate the evildoers in the simplest, most expeditious, and least cruel way possible." ⁴¹

"Politically unrelated elements. Don't see every dissenter or intermediary as a traitor, or we may widen the radius of attack too much." 42

"...liquidate the hated enemies of the people who have blood debts with those who demand justice; reduce the radius of attack, otherwise it will generate counterproductive actions, this is automatic. Look at the executions to see if mistakes were made and analyze why." ⁴³

Partisan politics in selective annihilation, which, it should be noted, has been a significantly lower percentage within the four forms of struggle, has always been coherent and clear. The Party leadership specified according to the circumstances of the development of the people's war, adhering to a correct proletarian policy. Prior to April 3, annihilation was rigorously selective, with only a very small number executed in People's Trials where politically mobilized peasants, supported by the guerrilla, would themselves apprehend their exploiters and subject them to trial. Often, due to the century-old class hatred contained within these masses. there would be kicks, punches, and so on directed at the exploiters. The Central Leadership even specified: "to create a barrier so that they can be judged and the people can express their grievances (if a peasant spits on or slaps someone, that is excessive, but not to allow them to be stabbed), to conduct the trial and, once the sentence has been defined, to execute it in the most expeditious manner, without cruelty, because that is reactionary, sadism is reactionary." 44

The situation changed when the Armed Forces entered, and with the barbaric massacres they unleashed using organized military forces to restore and defend the repudiated power of the local bosses, polarization arose. The sector of conservative or reactionary peasants, led by the Armed Forces, and the revolutionary peasantry under the Party's leadership confronted each other brutally, using the weapons and means at their disposal. In these circumstances, the cost on both sides increased significantly, with a clear difference in the political guidance that each applied. The Peruvian State, the Army, and the military forces were guided by a genocidal policy, while the PCP defended the interests of the masses, applying selective blows to the recalcitrant counter-revolutionaries. There were isolated expressions of bourgeois militaristic extremism as excesses, completely outside the PCP's political line, as happened in Lucanamarca on April 3, 1983, as we will see later. In summary, the PCP has openly applied its policy of selective blows, not indiscriminate ones, against proven enemies of the people and the revolution, explicitly affirming that "in our revolutionary war, we apply and will apply a policy of prisoners and struggle that corresponds to the laws of war." ⁴⁵ Similarly, in the Expanded Session of the Central Committee in 1985, it was specified that "the radius of attack should be reduced, they should be divided and eliminated part by part, always isolating the most recalcitrant." In February 1991, at the II Plenum of the Central Committee, it was established that "the target should be

selective annihilation against those who apply it at **the highest possible level.**" In the same year, the May Directives for Metropolitan Lima ordered:

"We insist that street policemen should not be hit, but rather those specialized in counter-subversive actions. The norm should be applied in selective annihilation: first the Armed Forces (Navy, Army and Air Force), Police Forces specialized in counter-subversive action; then the genocidists, all those who have blood debts and torturers; afterwards the rondas, which are now also being organized in cities. Differentiate between black heads and pressured masses; apply a double policy, penetrate and undermine them until they rise up in rebellion; to the pressured masses make them understand that they are being used against their own interests, that they are being exploited for their unemployment, hunger, and needs, to act as cannon fodder in the absence of soldiers and police."46

In the Preparatory Session of the II Plenary, a set of political changes were identified, such as no longer attacking cooperatives or making an effort to comply with Article 9 of the Geneva Convention, in February 1991. In February 1992, during the preparatory meetings of the III Plenary, we proposed to abolish the third form of struggle, that is, selective annihilation.

And in application of the progress made at the III Plenary of the Central Committee of 1992, in a letter of support for the request for talks by Chairman Gonzalo and comrade Miriam to end the conflict through a Peace Agreement, a call was made to abolish selective annihilation and to explicitly comply with Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.

Thus, the response action in Lucanamarca on April 3, 1983, was a defensive action after the savage attack of the Armed Forces and their complementary forces, the mesnadas, to restore their obsolete and hated gamonal power with horrific massacres, and was part of the response to that atrocious entry and bloodshed unleashed in the Ayacucho, Huancavelica, and Apurimac region.

On April 3, a series of confrontations took place between the guerrilla forces and the armed groups in Yanaccollpa, Ataccara, Llachua, Muylacruz, and Lucanamarca. These were carried out according to a tactical operational plan developed by the responsible intermediate commanders in the area, as part of the complementary plan of the Batir II which the Party implemented while the CCA was in session. The first three places were estates where the wealthy landowners and peasants, primarily the heads of the armed groups, had numerous livestock, as stated by various "witnesses" in that district during the "Megaproceso." They had 700, 800, and even more than 1000 head of sheep, in addition to cattle, llamas, and some owned several estates. They used shepherds and, obviously, were defended by organized groups because they were expecting the guerrilla's response and attack after the restoration of the old power. Otherwise, why did they organize the surveillance system? Therefore, the first confrontations occurred there in the early morning. The guerrilla fighters were essentially poor peasants who made up the organized forces of the Cangallo-Fajardo Committee, which the Party ordered to converge to strike a decisive blow against the armed groups of Lucanamarca, the most active and aggressive in the area, who served the genocidal plan that the Armed Forces and armed groups were perpetrating with total impunity and carte blanche, acting with unheard-of cruelty, and whose victims included some of the combatants' own family members, who were burned alive, others were crushed, hacked to death with axes, stoned, etc. Thus, one can understand the deep hatred that they felt towards the armed groups, which would be the objective cause of why the military extremism appeared as an isolated and excessive act. The guerrillas did not have many modern weapons, but rather basic weapons. "Some had guns, some had axes, machetes, sticks, and knives," "they carried rifles, shotguns..." as stated by the local authorities in the Megaproceso. This explains that the fight with the armed groups, who mobilized masses under pressure, was fought with this type of weapon on both sides, in which women also participated.

The population of Lucanamarca was ordered by General Noel to repair the road at Muylacruz for the army's displacement and operations, which was the real purpose covered by the symbolic distribution of food that

was not enough for everyone, as the old authorities said in the Megaproceso. They carried out the civic action to portray the army as "kind-hearted." Upon learning this, the old authorities organized an attack against the guerrilla forces. They sent a group of 15 people to confront them, and a clash occurred at Ranracruz, where some were killed, while the rest were annihilated at Muylacruz. Another group was sent as a commission to Huancasancos to inform and guide the armed forces. The majority of the people retreated to Lucanamarca, where they concentrated and sent messengers to the annexes to ask for help. They implemented a plan of confrontation made by the army, as the former authorities mentioned in the Megaproceso testified, "They always told us, if something comes up, go up (to Calvary hill) and defend yourselves from there, prepare stones or anything you can find, and we gathered there." "We said more people are coming, so together we would have more strength," "Some brave people waited and fought," "On the top, we expected to fight with sticks, and we had knives and blades," "People from the annexes came with huaraquitas to defend us." They were trying to cover up the fact that they were organized and directed by trained individuals and had the weapons that they themselves pointed out before they collected them from homes.

When guerrilla fighters entered Lucanamarca in the late afternoon hours, a violent confrontation occurred with the armed groups who used pressured masses to protect themselves. They thought they could surpass

and reverse the guerrilla attack as had happened in Sancos with the militias on February 16 and 20: "I organized the people, just with slingshots. We thought only three or four had bullets, we were going to make them waste their bullets and then attack," "only four or five had machine guns."47 Neither the Black Heads nor the Armed Forces imagined the magnitude of the attack. On the contrary, the armed groups were hopeful that the Army would come to their aid. Once defeated and reduced, the armed groups and all the people gathered in the square were judged and a policy of differentiation was applied: "the women were separated to one side, and the men on the blacklist were called out by name." 48 "Were there men, women, and children? He said: there were only men lying on their backs or face down. Where were the women and children from the village? He said: they were on one side."49 Among those who remained were "old people, children, I myself was carrying my son on my back, there were many people from the village." ⁵⁰ The two people cited agreed in specifying that no more than 10 people, only men, were killed in the Lucanamarca square. The rest were left alive, a version that confirms the statement of the latter, who waited for General Noel with the 10 dead for about two days and, as he did not arrive, they buried them. Thus, many people, men and women, were gathered in the square, and the facts prove unequivocally that they were selectively annihilated, not all of them. No child or woman was killed in the same village. Gualberto Tacas himself said that "a humble boy, another humble boy, another little man" were separated, "very few of us were massacred."⁵¹ Before the gathered population, the guerrilla explained the reasons for the response against the armed groups and concluded the action, proceeding to withdraw in an orderly manner, as confirmed by the accounts of Marcelino Casavilca and Edda Huaripaucar in Megaproceso, consistent with the aforementioned report by Caretas in April 1983. The guerrillas "gathered, shouted their numbers (from 1 to 32), and left the village," they also said they left chanting their slogans. Everything else is a set of absurd accusations and inventions, such as the reckless assertion without evidence, an immense falsehood, that "in the moments when the women had been sprayed with kerosene to be burned," a child shouted "the guards are coming," which saved the population from being completely massacred. They attribute to the guerrilla what the Armed Forces and the armed groups were doing to discredit them. There is evidence that the Armed Forces and the armed groups schemed the versions that should be given, twisting the facts in the so-called testimonies, a hoax that was even dismantled because the Caretas report made immediately after the events of April 3, did not mention them at all.

The Communist Party of Peru immediately analyzed the events at the II Plenary Session of the CCA, stating:

> "We have faced sinister massacres: Huaychao, Uchuraccay, Huambo, Lucanamarca, and we have overcome them, today the combatants are tightening the

screws for them... They are settling scores with some executioners, and if there has been excess, it has been just that, excess." (Page 322)

And in July 1983, analyzing the same action it was said:

"...to help the masses understand that we represent their interests, the extreme militaristic killings do not serve this purpose. We must learn from cases such as Lucanamarca. Firstly, we cannot justify the actions of the reactionary forces. Those who acted must self-criticize. Our goal is to unite 90% of the people to defend them."

Later, in November 1985, at the Extended Session of the Central Committee, this armed action was reevaluated in its two aspects and it was stated:

"The Party responded by hitting the mob in Lucanamarca hard, which subdued them. This is the main aspect of this action, but it also has another negative aspect: military extremism. There are other cases of this, such as Soras, but they are isolated cases and a product of desperation. Lenin says that one can have a margin of excess in armed action, but the problem is not to exceed the limit, which means not turning it into a general policy" (page 22).

Thus, its political importance is highlighted: having subdued and broken the use of mobs and the formation of rondas, plans that had to be postponed until a later time in 1991 and 1992, but unlike the first time in 1983-1984, this time they were armed, although with very basic weapons, rifles that the peasants called "soc-soc," and they were distributed in small numbers but always commanded by their licensed members, organized and instructed by the Army, as Hermoza Rios, the Chief of the Joint Command at that time, writes. Where do some Commissioners get the idea that Apurimac had 500,000 armed ronderos? Its negative aspect needs to be emphasized: excess, military extremism that has never been the general policy of the Communist Party of Peru.

Indeed, in the villages of the Huancasancos province, the reactionary plan of the militias was defeated by the blows dealt to the gamonalillos, cabezas negras, despots, and mercenaries - the social base of the army to launch the people against the guerrilla. This situation forced the Armed Forces to establish Anti-Subversive Bases in Sancos and Lucanamarca to maintain control and directly control the population in the months and long years to come. While they subdued the masses, acting with ferocity as an occupying force, detaining, torturing, raping women, disappearing and murdering them, through this white terror they forced the oppressed masses to perform surveillance day and night, to participate in looting and massacres in neighboring villages, using them as protective shields and cannon fodder. also forced the entire population to give them firewood,

meat, food, etc. However, they could not organize the so-called "Self-Defense Committees" (CADS) until they were given weapons in 1994, but that same year, as soon as they withdrew the anti-subversive bases, they disintegrated and came to nothing, which demonstrates that the masses were always against being used as militias.

In summary, in the course of the People's War that had entered a qualitative leap, the resounding response of the Communist Party of Peru to the entry of the Armed Forces in the Ayacucho, Huancavelica, and Apurimac regions, carrying out the Great Plan to Conquer Bases in this region and throughout the country, which involved striking at the restorations, developing harvests, and applying defense, development, and construction of People's Committees, as an expression of the Bases of Support, thwarted their insidious plans to wipe out the Communist Party and destroy the People's War and the New Power, suppressing their genocidal counterrevolutionary plan of using militias, opposing masses against masses, and reactionary military action, with the blow in Lucanamarca on April 3 being part of this response. The accusations that these actions were "reprisals," "vengeance," "furious reaction," revenge by leader Abimael Guzmán, that "the purpose of said massacre was to give a lesson," demonstrate a political position expressly designed to attack Dr. Guzmán as a dangerous person, a monster, a psychopath, etc., etc., in other words, an ad hominem argument like the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVR) did, looking for a scapegoat, rather than objective causes or as the prosecution seeks to apply "copyright law" rather than facts in a clear retreat of Peruvian criminal law; in addition to its narrow idea, as they take it out of the context of the war that was developing, and specifically from the political and military fact of background that was occurring: restoration and counter-restoration.

The actual historical fact is that the people's war faced and prevailed over the annihilation plan that the Armed Forces elaborated in defense of the old state of exploitation and oppression. The Communist Party of Peru responded by building a People's Guerrilla Army of 3000 fighters in three forces: Main, Local and Base, incorporating militiamen. Despite the fierce and merciless massacre perpetrated, the Armed Forces failed loudly in their objectives. The heroic people's war broke their plan of using "mesnadas" (paramilitary groups) and forming "rondas" at the national level, with which they thought they would sweep away the PCP and end the revolutionary war in 1983. The black counterrevolutionary heads were severely beaten and isolated, and the masses expressed resistance and rejection of the sinister mesnadas plan, so they had to postpone it until 1989 or 1990-91 when they re-launched it on a wider scale.

Faced with this political and military defeat, and the discredit of the Peruvian state and its Armed Forces, understanding that it was not so easy to defeat the people's war, they continued their counterrevolutionary war by resorting to the darkest, most deprayed, and infamous genocide, one of the greatest infamies in the republican history of Peru. With the support of the black head ras-

cals and by forcing masses under their control to participate, they launched the most merciless annihilation of peasants and the destruction of communities and small towns.

On April 4, 1983, a group of black-headed individuals in Lucanamarca brutally and mercilessly murdered Oligario Curitumay's parents, and with blind and furious hatred, they continued seeking revenge. According to the aforementioned Amnesty International letter to President Belaúnde, from April 4 to 10, they massacred 69 people. On April 6, the repressive forces and henchmen of Lucanamarca targeted the Espite community, "resulting in a considerable loss of lives," and "in addition to the 305 guerrillas who were reported to have been killed in May by the Ayacucho Command, it is said that 70 were killed in Sacsamarca on the same day (May 21st)," and "between May 6 and June 8, 1983, 374 terrorists died."

Some of these unrestrained bloodbath events of that period are only now coming to the public's attention. In the March-April 2006 issue of "QueHacer," it was reported that "a massacre of community members, teachers, and students from nearby communities (including Raccaya) by military patrols took place in Umasi in 1983." They were caught off guard by a military patrol, and none of them survived the attack. According to witnesses, a mass grave containing 41 bodies is still behind the village school. These and countless other unpunished massacres demonstrate how the counterinsurgency war was guided by a genocidal policy of exter-

mination.

And the genocide continued insatiably not only in Ayacucho, in its frustrated attempts to isolate the guerrillas from the peasant masses, especially the poor, but also spread throughout the country, and the armed reaction fed on the unarmed people's flesh and blood to the point of satiety, expressing macabre characteristics.

The following examples illustrate very expressively how the Armed Forces proceeded in their counterinsurgency war: General Luis Cisneros Vizquerra declared, "They would have to start killing both Senderistas and non-Senderistas because that is the only way they could ensure success. They kill sixty people and maybe there are three Senderistas among them." He said this in 1982, before they entered directly. When they did, among the long list of numerous massacres, was the Accomarca genocide, which the CVR treated with a silk handkerchief, and the press hid or belittled it. They murdered 90 peasants there, including elderly, children, and women, whom they savagely raped, all of them, and after locking them in different houses, they killed them all with shots, then burned the houses with the dead inside, and threw the babies into the fire. Finally, they celebrated with a party. The direct perpetrator of the abominable and horrendous act, Telmo Hurtado, declared with total brazenness before the "Senate Investigative Commission:" "I consider it correct," "one cannot trust a woman, an elderly person, or a child... they (the terrorists) start indoctrinating them from two or three years old, little by little, by force, by deception,

by punishment, they gain them over to their cause." Years later, his "courage" and "heroism" were rewarded with impunity, promotion, and state protection. Likewise, many other genocidal commanders were rewarded, clearly proving that they were eager to carry out the state's genocidal orders and plans very well, and thus deserving recognition.

The Peruvian state has repeatedly opposed the disclosure of the authentic historical truth of events, in order to cover up its genocidal policy implemented by the Armed Forces, Police Forces, and Complementary Forces, and to accuse the Communist Party of Peru of being "terrorists," "the main perpetrator of crimes and human rights violations," etc. To achieve this purpose, the so-called "Truth and Reconciliation Commission" was created by decree, which became the brain behind the manipulation and distortion of the events that took place. In the specific case of Lucanamarca, it only collected testimony from the local power, the gamonalillos, the militia, and the relatives of those who died on April 3, ignoring that the Army took advantage of our retreat and remained in the war zones as the "winners" from 1992 to 2001. In addition, they edited the testimonies according to their convenience, ignored the opposing side, and silenced the genocide that the Armed Forces and militias had been committing since the beginning of 1983 in the area.

Part of this conspiracy and manipulation of facts is the show staged with the exhumations in November 2002, trafficking with the crude argument that "The process of search, recovery, identification, and restitution to their families of remains of victims exhumed from clandestine graves (sic), is included within the mandate of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission," that "it is convenient to understand the religious and social significance that this task has for the families of the victims who have lived for years a long and distorted grief, covered with a cruel uncertainty created by the eagerness to know if those remains are those of their loved ones, in order to be able to bury them and process their death," as written in their brochure "LUCANAMARCA: a stubborn hope" and under the pretentious title "Unearthing the Truth," by the aforementioned Truth and Reconciliation Commission with rich American financing.

False. There were no clandestine mass graves for those who died on April 3rd. All of the deceased were buried by their own families according to their traditions and customs, so they knew exactly the location of each person's remains. This has been confirmed in the Megaproceso (a judicial process in Peru), with the testimony of Heráclides Misaico, who said she buried her dead in Llachua, and Edda Huaripaucar, who declared that after waiting for General Noel for two days and seeing that he didn't arrive, they buried the 10 dead in the cemetery of Lucanamarca. The so-called CVR (Truth and Reconciliation Commission), contradicting itself, has registered in the same booklet: "Local authorities along with survivors and victims' families proceeded to bury the remains in the places where the events occurred." Likewise, expert witness Estrada Moreno in the Megaproceso said, "The burial was not carried out by those who carried out these actions but by the families... there was a careful burial there." However, it is true that there are many clandestine mass graves of those murdered and disappeared by the army and militias in Lucanamarca and other towns in the province of Huancasancos, whose locations are known today from the denunciations of the masses themselves. The so-called CVR was not interested in investigating, identifying, and returning those remains to their families.

Therefore, the spectacle created around the exhumation, filming, mass, burial, and the hypocritical "apology" by Toledo when he traveled specifically for the burial of those remains in January 2003, and promised to build school classrooms that he never fulfilled, has been nothing but a political ploy, with extensive media coverage, designed to generate public opinion against the PCP (Communist Party of Peru), accusing it of carrying out an "indiscriminate massacre" of the population "out of revenge" or "to set an example," and to discredit the revolution and the revolutionaries, with Chairman Gonzalo as the target.

But what have they been able to demonstrate with all the pompous display they made with that team called "Joint Platform for Work on Mass Graves Investigation" that carried out all their work in five days, from November 9 to 14, 2002, not in two weeks as expert Estrada said in the "Megaproceso?" Nothing that proves the charges. They have unearthed the remains of sixty-two people, of which, as the same expert said, "it is really

difficult to establish" the time that has passed since they died. For example, it is not possible to differentiate the temporality of whether those remains are from the events of April 3 or they may be from massacres perpetrated by the Army or the killings that occurred in the immediately preceding or following dates. Additionally, considering the ritual of the "tullo pallay" practiced by the community members, according to the expert himself, the bones found are mixed with bones from burials performed at different stages of the history of Lucanamarca. All they have done is describe where a set of remains and bones were collected and the circumstances and conditions in which they were found, which they have essentially identified by taking information from the memories of family members regarding the clothing in which they were buried. Thus, there is nothing scientifically-based that confirms and proves that the remains found of children, women, and elderly people correspond to those who died on April 3: the farce of the exhumations under the pretext that it is "a first step in the search for truth, justice, and reconciliation" has been cunningly manipulated by the so-called CVR to present as evidence of the imputation against Chairman Gonzalo and the Central Committee of the PCP, the having "decided and planned" the annihilation of the entire population of Lucanamarca, for which they recommended that "when possible, opening a trial against those responsible for that crime would be a second step". This reveals the real underlying interest, since based on that report, after more than 21 years

since the events, they only made the criminal complaint, the self-opening of the investigation, and then the prosecution, when the statute of limitations has already expired due to the time that has passed. Moreover, they were the promoters of the political pressure against the Judiciary that opened the trial against the PCP leaders in November 2004 without including this case, as they say, "as emblematic." It is worth remembering that precisely because of that pressure and political interference, the Peruvian State broke the trial of that date. Is that telling the truth? Is that serving reconciliation? Or is it acting as lackeys of an exploitative state submitted to Bush's policy of world war against terrorism?

1.4 Homage to the Heroes of the People

Since 1980, the popular struggle has risen to a level never before seen. The People's War, essentially a peasant war under proletarian leadership, mobilized and incorporated thousands of women, men, and youth, becoming the largest revolutionary social movement in Peruvian history. Embracing the slogan "Rebellion is justified," the people, mainly the poor peasantry, rose up like a giant with colossal strength, breaking chains, conquering land, sweeping away servitude and ideas of submission and servility, exposing the obsolescence and fragility of the state and its repressive forces, and depriving them of initiative for over a decade, beginning to build the new society in People's Committees, whose honey began to

be tasted and its fruits harvested. The People's War has contributed to and inspired revolutionaries around the world.

During this process, our people have shown immense courage, wisdom, and initiative to face failures and painful losses, and, drying their tears, cleaning the bloodstains, they have buried the fallen, returning to fight with renewed vigor, trusting in their own strength to recover what was lost, again and again.

That tireless struggle and spilled blood have not been and will not be in vain. It has propelled the Democratic Path forward and has brought us even closer to true and inevitable emancipation. Their example, experiences, and lessons are the foundation, the cornerstone of the future. The unwavering group of communists, fighters, and children of the people, without fear of imprisonment, torture, exile, and even death, have displayed their heroism and transformed it into a blazing red banner that flutters, calling and teaching the way. We highlight the glorious example of comrade Norah, the greatest heroine of the Party and the Revolution, and the thousands of heroes, mainly poor peasants who have given their lives for the people's interests, becoming communist minds and peasant arms.

As we pay solemn tribute to them, we thank them for allowing us to fight alongside them, learning from their selflessness and limitless dedication, their optimism and firm belief in the future, wholeheartedly serving the people. We must always follow the bright path that they have opened for us. We deeply regret the inevitable loss of lives that the people's war has meant for both sides in the conflict, with the consequent suffering and pain for family and friends.

It is painful that the emancipation of the people has once again been postponed. However, those two decades of people's war have made progress in the destruction of semi-feudalism, which is corroded and will not be the same as it was in the 20th century. Although the semicolonial character has been accentuated, the general development of the political consciousness of the people enhances their anti-imperialist spirit, rejecting mainly the hegemonic superpower as the main enemy of the peoples of the world. Regarding the bureaucratic capitalism that develops fettered to semi-feudalism and subjected to semi-colonialism, it is evolving and causing greater rejection of neoliberalism among the masses, which is the cause of growing unemployment. They ardently demand their social rights and demands, although still disorganized. The class struggle of the masses against the three mountains and the bureaucratic path continues under new conditions. This evolutionary, anti-people path, by its class character, will never solve the problems and demands of the people, as long as the democratic path does not accomplish the task of changing the mode of production and transforming the social relations of society. What has the Peruvian State done in the last 14 years for the post-war reconstruction of the peoples in the areas where the armed conflict took place? And what about reconciliation? Does the State Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVR) think it has served any purpose in the five years since its self-constitution? Do they think that by putting themselves above all institutions of their system, they can shoot them down? And finally, what social support does it have? From the bottom? None!

In July 1993, in the context of the Round of Conversations for a Peace Agreement, Chairman Gonzalo and Comrade Miriam, in the document "Foundations for a Basis for a Peace Agreement" [NOTE FROM RL: This is a work of forgery, there is no proof that Gonzalo wrote this work.] document presented to the State, raised, among other points:

"10. As peace is gradually restored, legislation must be adjusted to strictly respect fundamental rights, both of individuals and economic and social rights; it must also address the people's demands for democracy and development, mainly their basic needs. An Special Development Plan for the areas affected by the war should benefit primarily peasants, poor masses in urban areas, and workers, paying substantive attention to the war-disabled, orphans, and widows."

But no Peace Agreement was reached, mainly due to the responsibility of the Peruvian state, despite the fact that it was an essential need for the people, the nation, and Peruvian society as a whole. And since then, despite the long years that have passed, nothing important has been done for those communities, and the harsh reality of those areas is currently even reported by media outlets that are far from being revolutionary. In "Quehacer," issue 159, March-April 2006, there are reports on the current situation of various communities in the central-western part of Ayacucho, such as Umasi, Raccaya, Canaria, and Cayara in Víctor Fajardo, and in the North, in Huanta: Uchuraccay, Huavchao, Nacabamba, Tupín, Cunya, Huaynacancha, etc., who, as always, "continue to be abandoned to their fate." Of the districts of Canaria and Cavara, where the military perpetrated massive and barbaric killings as we have already mentioned, it is said, "Despite all the human rights violations (by the armed forces), cases of disappearances, and the destruction of homes and property of these inhabitants, to date, the relatives and residents...have not obtained the justice they expect or the money to repair the damages caused," but they themselves, through communal initiative and action, through collective work, rebuild services, build schools, and even the municipality pays the salaries of teachers so that the children of the community members can study. Throughout the highlands of Huanta, these communities that were used as cannon fodder, pitting people against people in the counterrevolutionary war, "feel abandoned by the state, despite the fact that their parents had sacrificed their lives defending it" (Ibid). Just as before the start of the people's war, today in the post-war period, they continue to subsist outside the state, under local power, but increasingly practicing their own ways of "communal justice." Likewise, in "El Comercio" of October 4, 2003, there is a report on Lucanamarca: "Journey to the land of oblivion," which records the extreme poverty and neglect in which the population of this district and its eight annexes live. And in "Caretas" of 2006, it is said that Lucanamarca remains divided between those who are pro- and anti-Sendero Luminoso.

Currently, the general situation of the masses in the rural villages of Ayacucho is not different from the reality of the mentioned villages. But there is another aspect that we note and highlight: With the process of the People's War, a main and transcendent achievement has been produced, their political consciousness has been developed, mainly among the poor masses of the countryside, and today they are carrying out a set of struggles demanding attention to their fundamental rights from the Peruvian state, in which rural women are also an active and important part, as reported by the magazine "Quehacer:" "Since the time of violence, women have been taking on other roles," even becoming community leaders.

It is true that the State and various NGOs have been forced to take civic action and implement plans in these areas, which are ultimately the byproduct of the revolution. The Party and the People's War have forced the rulers and the exploiting classes to concern themselves with and talk about the countryside, making promises and offers that generally have remained just words. Likewise, in each electoral process, different political parties of the big bourgeoisie make proposals and promises based on their class interests in order to gain votes,

as happened in the last elections and is also happening now. All of this only demonstrates the invariable existence of exploitation and oppression in which the vast majority live, as well as the secular abandonment, hunger, poverty, ignorance, and backwardness in which they are submerged. These are the objective causes stated by the PCP for the start of the People's War. fundamental problems and demands that remain unsatisfied to this day, exacerbated by a serious social crisis and an increase in poverty and extreme poverty. In the process of reversing the gains and advances of the People's War, with the presence of the Armed Forces until 2001 and seeking to restore the old discredited power that was rejected by the masses, some plans were implemented, such as the Support Program for Repopulation (PAR), which promoted the return of some displaced groups, such as those from Uchuraccay and others, building adobe houses only for a sector of the population, providing toilets and medical facilities, or recently providing electric lighting and telephone service in Huaychao. But, as reported by the mentioned magazine, they have no way of paying for the consumption, and most of the houses and even the community centers "have no light because, despite the availability of electricity, there are no plugs or light bulbs." In Lucanamarca, in 2003, the government offered windows and roofs only for 30 direct relatives of those killed on April 3, but on the condition that they build the house themselves, each with their own means, including widows and elderly people, without any resources or support of any

kind. Lately, according to Caretas of July 6, 2006, they inaugurated a bakery with German aid, and it has been said that "it is a way of ensuring the economic income of the families of Lucanamarca." They only bring crumbs to all these towns, which are in no way a solution to their fundamental needs and demands, and it is evident, as before and always, that the prevailing system is a false democracy, of false rights and freedoms, of false concern for the basic needs of the people, and of real oppression and exploitation in the service of the exploiting classes and the imperialist master, mainly Yankee. But it has also recorded a political fact of importance and current relevance, which is not only of Lucanamarca but a general problem of all the areas where the war has been developed, and therefore a problem of Peruvian society as a whole: "The social structure of the town is fractured, facing resentment and suspicions between families since that April - those who were with the terrorists (revolutionaries) and those who were not, those who motivated the tragedy - and a weakened sense of authority in the midst of poverty."

Although the great epic of the People's War in Peru unfolded as a peasant war whose main scope was the countryside, it also encompassed the city as a complement from the beginning. It involved Peruvian society as a whole and has been embodied as the most transcendent social transformation movement for the benefit of the underprivileged in Peruvian history to date. With all its limitations, errors, and excesses, it has left significant achievements, mainly for the people. What

achievements have been obtained in these two decades of revolutionary process in Peru? With regards to the three mountains weighing on the shoulders of the people: semi-feudalism has been corroded, undermined, and there is a growing decomposition of the communities, and therefore a greater weakening of local power, systematically questioned by the masses themselves, more so where the New Power was located. While it has not been a completely destroyed economic base, its strong undermining has reactivated the problem of land, the productivity of the countryside, the problem of prices, and the usury or exploitation of large speculators (such as potato farmers in Huancavelica). It cannot be denied that there are still areas where the Peruvian state either does not exist or is still very weak. This reality can no longer be concealed, and it is the very communes or peasants who make it evident. Moreover, new towns are emerging where others disappeared in the war, and their characteristics are quite different. For example, the greater concentration of houses, their architectural arrangement in streets, the basic minimum services of electricity, water, or roads; in short, evident by-products of the revolution that summarize the real progress in undermining the first and heaviest mountain of oppression of our people.

Regarding submission to imperialism, the people's war in Peru exposed and struck the plans of semicolonial subjugation by imperialism, mainly by the United States, which seeks to reduce us to a mere supplier of raw materials, deny national production, and prevent our for-

mation as a nation with our own economy, territory, and culture, including the bilingual language that exists. However, due to the insufficient development of its forces and a problem of proletarian political leadership at a time when new, complex, and very serious problems had to be solved at all levels, the revolution failed. The imperialism then launched a general counterrevolutionary anti-communist offensive, and in Peru, they promoted their neoliberalism and privatization, which practically sold the country to the highest bidder by the dictatorship, and globalized mining companies seized our mineral deposits at a bargain price, resulting in loss of life, benefits, and damage to the environment for the people. However, if this character of subjection to imperialism is the one that has been most accentuated, anti-imperialism manifests itself not with depth but with greater extension in the various social classes. The mining proletariat, more conscious than before, paralyzes the large exploitative mines with their struggle, the peasantry demands that their lands not be contaminated, the petty bourgeoisie requests increases for their skilled professionals, and even the middle bourgeoisie opposes the nefarious Free Trade Agreement. Politically, new parties that channel the serious crisis of the Peruvian left appear, raising the anti-imperialist flag and even channeling the radical vote of extreme poverty. Therefore, its accentuation also promotes antiimperialist rejection.

And over one hundred years of bureaucratic capitalism, what did it bring to the Peruvian people, the Peruvian nation, and Peruvian society? Nothing for the people but the exploitation or constraint of their productive forces, the backwardness of the nation ranking among the last in America and the world, and a slow evolutionary process of the capitalist path tied to semifeudalism and imperialist domination. Peru has 50% poverty in general, 25% extreme poverty, and basic needs and fundamental rights continue to be unaddressed; the gap between exploiters or oppressors and exploited or oppressed has deepened further, as noted by well-known economists. And the 30-year delay in agriculture and 30-year delay in industrial production were exacerbated during the Fujimori dictatorship, which introduced neoliberalism, privatization, and globalization. But as the revolution, despite its retreat, does not stop, it notes that there is an evolutionary process of small bourgeois capitalism or middle-class bourgeoisie that fights bureaucratic capitalism, and as the great Lenin teaches us, the revolution has nothing to fear from a capitalist development of the countryside. Communists also insist that in times of setbacks or defeats, they should support everything that serves the people, unmask what opposes them, and strive for the people to forge their own path of emancipation amid those small but significant struggles, because despite everything, the people never stop fighting. And as Chairman Mao concludes, confidence in the Party and confidence in the masses.

Let's highlight that the Peru of the underdogs learned to fight and build something new from scratch, a People's Guerrilla Army, a New Power, a militarized Party and a Leadership with great absolute disinterest, service to the people and total dedication to the ideals of communism for 50 years, which gave it the great authority it has managed to have until today despite what others may say. Their political experience is greater, their revolutionary consciousness clearer and over time, let us support their tireless struggle with our political struggle without weapons in this new moment of the Fourth party stage and let us begin by supporting the new specification of the fundamental politics of 1992 to the current conditions proposed by Chairman Gonzalo and Comrade Miriam: Political Solution! General Amnesty! and National Reconciliation!

Notes

- ¹Develop the People's War by Serving the World Revolution. August 1986. Communist Party of Peru.
- ²Second Letter from Chairman Gonzalo and comrade Miriam to President Fujimori. July 1993. NOTE FROM RL: This is a work of forgery, falsely attributed to Chairman Gonzalo.
- ³Develop the Growing People's Protest. Communist Party of Peru. September 1979.
- ⁴ Against Constitutional Illusions, for the State of New Democracy. Communist Party of Peru. April 1978.
- $^5Bases\ of\ Discussion.$ Communist Party of Peru. $Democratic\ Revolution.$
 - ⁶ Ibid.
 - ⁷ Ibid.
 - 8 Ibid.
 - ⁹ Ibid.
- $^{10} Develop\ the\ Growing\ People's\ Protest.$ Communist Party of Peru. September 1979.
 - ¹¹ We are the Initiators. First Military School. April 19, 1980.
- $^{12} Bases \ of \ Discussion.$ Communist Party of Peru. Military Line.
- $^{13} Bases \ of \ Discussion.$ Communist Party of Peru. $Democratic \ Revolution.$
- $^{14} Bases \ of \ Discussion.$ Communist Party of Peru. Military Line.
 - $^{15}Ibid.$
 - 16 Ibid.
 - $^{17}Ibid.$
- ¹⁸Don't Vote: Instead, Expand the Guerrilla Warfare to Conquer Power for the People. Communist Party of Peru. February 1985.
- ¹⁹Develop the People's War by Serving the World Revolution. August 1986. Communist Party of Peru.
- ²⁰Bases of Discussion. Communist Party of Peru. Military Line.
- ²¹Second Plenary Session of the Expanded Central Committee. Communist Party of Peru. January 1983.
 - 22 Ibid.

NOTES

- $^{23}Ibid.$
- 24 CVR. Volume I. Page 259.
- ²⁵Extended Session of the Central Committee. Communist Party of Peru. November 1985. Page 22.
 - ²⁶ QueHacer 159. March April 2006. pages 43-44.
 - ^{27}CVR . Volume V. Page 131.
 - ²⁸ El Comercio. January 24, 1983.
- ²⁹El Observador. February 7, 1983. (Interview with Virgilio Roel).
 - ³⁰ II Plenary Session of the Expanded Central Committee
 - ³¹Act 38 of the Megaproceso. April 3, 2006.
 - ³² Act 38, Ibid.
 - ^{33}CVR . Volume V. Page 71.
 - $^{34}Act~38~of~the~Megaproceso.$
 - ^{35}CVR . Volume 5. Page 73.
- ³⁶Develop the People's War by Serving the World Revolution. August 1986. Communist Party of Peru.
 - ^{37}CVR . Volume 5. Page 72.
 - ³⁸II Plenary Session of the Expanded Central Committee
- $^{39}\mathrm{V}$ Plenum of the Central Committee. Communist Party of Peru. 1981.
 - 40 Ibid.
 - 41 Ibid.
 - $^{42}Ibid.$
 - ⁴³ Ibid.
 - 44 Ibid.
- ⁴⁵Develop the Guerrilla Warfare. Central Committee of the Communist Party of Peru. March 1982.
- ⁴⁶ Directives of May for Metropolitan Lima. Central Committee of the Communist Party of Peru. May 1991. Page 13.
- ⁴⁷Statements by Gualberto Tacas, former mayor, to Caretas magazine. April 1983.
 - ⁴⁸Teófanes Allcahuamán. Megaproceso.
 - ⁴⁹Marcelino Casavilca. Megaproceso.
 - ⁵⁰Edda Huaripaucar. Megaproceso.
 - ⁵¹Caretas. Ibid.

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